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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The manner in which community college administrators have developed and
implemented campus threat assessment policies to objectively address threats of violence on
campus is largely unknown when it comes to the management of such potential acts. Based on
the literature reviewed regarding campus violence, 4-year academic institutions have conducted
comprehensive reviews of campus safety policies on their respective campuses. There has been
some limited attention by researchers addressing campus violence at 2-year or community
colleges; however, there appears to be quite a void.
Based on the literature, administrative reviews at 4-year institutions have occurred in
order to update or revise current policies. What is unknown, however, is whether community
colleges have also recognized this necessity. Campus threat assessment policies are typically
far-reaching. They impact all facets of community college operations, including not only public
safety and/or law enforcement but also instructional and student affairs services.
The most significant outcome of the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007 is that institutions of
higher education recognized the need for a threat assessment policy to be in place for prudent
prevention and management of potential acts of violence. This tragic event nearly a decade ago
was the catalyst for change and an impetus for inquiry. Potential acts of violence include not
only weapon-involved incidents, such as those involving guns or knives, but also robberies,
rapes, domestic violence, and even simple assaults. There may be other identified threats that
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could have an impact on campus safety as well, such as citizens in the community who have
communicated in some manner their intent to do harm on campus. The mechanism for threat
assessment is the creation of a threat assessment team. It is the team’s responsibility to evaluate
the legitimacy of the concern or threat reported, assess the likelihood that the person in question
may cause harm to himself/herself or others, develop a plan for reducing the risk, implement the
plan, and then continually monitor or re-evaluate the situation to ensure effectiveness (Deisinger,
Randazzo, O’Neill, & Savage, 2008). In addition, the committee can collect and review data on
a periodic basis for the purpose of identifying strategies for reducing the probability of violence
by using interventions such as education and training. This is a deductive process that “primarily
focuses on the facts of the particular case in question to guide to inferences; that examines
closely the progression of ideas and planning behaviors; and that corroborates information
gathered from multiple sources” (Reddy et al., 2001, p. 167).
Community college leaders have implemented threat assessment protocols to prevent or
manage specific threats of violence; however, minimal research exists to confirm this statement.
The motivations are clear for implementing preventive measures, for example, making the
campus environment safe for all, reducing liability to the school, and easing fear or even the
perception of fear among students, staff, and faculty (Fox & Savage, 2009). The purpose of the
current research is to determine to what extent threat assessments are utilized within community
colleges and to ascertain how community colleges have implemented such assessments in order
to meet the need for a safer campus. The concept is not new. Deisinger et al. (2008) indicated
that this is a proactive approach to preventing and even managing potential acts of violence.
Another unknown, however, is whether prevention or management plans are developed from
objective or subjective criteria or a combination of the two. The issue of violence on community
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college campuses is extremely emotional and often ignites strong feelings and reactions among
students, staff, faculty, and even the community as a whole.
Therefore, this study addresses the lack of analysis regarding the implementation, use,
impact, and ultimately the benefits of threat assessments by community colleges, as well as
possible improvements to existing protocols.
Significance of the Research
The literature regarding threat assessment use in community colleges is lacking. It is
extensive, however, for 4-year colleges and universities (Baker & Boland, 2011; Fletcher &
Bryden, 2009; Keller, Hughes, & Hertz, 2011; Seo, Torabi, Sa, & Blair, 2012). This literature
does provide a template for all institutions of higher education with regard to campus threat
assessment existence and implementation. Therefore, the impetus for this study is to determine
whether community colleges have embraced threat assessment protocols as well and how such
protocols are structured and utilized. For those community colleges that do have threat
assessment protocols in place, this study investigates the ways that threat assessment teams use
the results of the assessment to prevent or manage a potential act of violence.
This study is also necessary to evaluate if community colleges may be overlooking data
that would significantly reduce the potential for violence, or if they could fail to notice potential
threats due to the way the data are collected, recorded, and reported. For example, if a violent
act is committed off campus against a community college student, this does not necessarily
suggest that the violence is not a community college issue that should be automatically excluded
from campus threat assessment. Omission of off-campus incident data may be problematic or
faulty. Instead, their inclusion may lead to violence prevention.
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In addition, the study may reveal a need for educational efforts in terms of strategies for
reducing the probability of incidents such an assaultive attack or date rape. Furthermore, current
practices in the prevention or management of campus violence in general are noble and wellintended but are not exhaustive in their attempts to provide a safer community college campus
environment. When dealing with the unpredictability of human behavior, community colleges
may find it impossible to be exhaustive in campus violence prevention or management planning.
As Fox (2008) indicated, “Over-aggressiveness in trying to identify and coerce a troubled and
belligerent student into treatment can potentially intensify feelings of persecution and precipitate
the very violent act that we’re attempting to avert” (p. 94). This statement highlights the
importance of a well-planned and well-thought-out campus threat assessment as well as the value
in being proactive in preventing and managing potential acts of violence on a college campus,
while still recognizing the drawback of unintended consequences. Threat assessment is not a
new concept; rather, it is an adaptation of concepts that have been around for many years. The
foundations of threat assessment rest in workplace violence prevention programs, Secret Service
protective intelligence models, and student development approaches to deal with students in
crisis in kindergarten through grade 12 public school settings (Dunkle, Silverstein, & Warner,
2008). Threat assessment is a cost-effective approach to dealing with potential acts of violence
in that threat assessment protocols typically use already available internal resources to assess and
manage the threats. The threat assessment team can be mobilized with existing stakeholders at
the academic institution. Threat assessment teams should be widely utilized by community
colleges; however, the existence of such teams is not well documented based upon the lack of
current literature and research.
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There are several focus points that provide further significance to this study. First and
foremost is the proposition that if campus threat assessment programs are developed and
implemented on community college campuses, then a dynamic approach can be used to prevent
or manage a potential act of violence. As a proactive approach, threat assessments seek to
identify potential threats and to activate necessary management plans to prevent or minimize
campus violence (Scalora, Simons, & VanSlyke, 2010). Despite Clery Act data that indicates
few acts of violence at community colleges, administrators at such institutions must always be
prepared for potential threats, thus having a threat assessment protocol in place is a valid
concern, as human behavior can be both predictable and unpredictable. The prevention of even
one act of violence has immeasurable value.
Second, student success should remain the primary goal of any violence prevention
initiative. Due to the traumatic nature of campus violence, not only on the student body as a
whole but also on the direct victims of the violence, there is an element of recovery that must be
addressed. In the case of the Virginia Tech shootings, several students lost their lives, but there
were also many who were injured with non-life-threatening wounds. Because of this, according
to Carr (2007), victims may need to leave school by either dropping out or taking a leave of
absence. They may move back home to recover, regroup, or transfer to another school.
Furthermore, Carr stated that when victims remain in school, they may have problems
concentrating, studying, and attending class. So in addition to having a proactive structured
assessment of violence system, there should also be responsive student affairs protocols in place
to assist students with coping and overcoming the stress caused by such an event and then
continuing forward with their academic goals.
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Third, the perception of campus violence is being sensationalized to the point that the
public believes many college campuses are not safe for students, staff, and faculty. To provide
perspective, Fisher (1995) indicated that a few violent campus incidents highlighted by the media
have cast a negative spotlight on college and university campuses and created the impression that
campuses are increasingly dangerous places. When campus safety procedures are being
evaluated, one must incorporate perceptions of fear into the evaluation. Apparently, actual
analysis of data on history and trends should be considered; however, Carmen, Polk, Segal, and
Bing (2000) asserted that college administration should be cognizant of the fear of crime and
should respond to students’ concerns in an attempt to retain and establish a safe learning
environment. The work of campus threat assessment teams can provide students with more
realistic perceptions. If items have been overlooked, those items can be addressed by the team; if
the items have been addressed, the uncovered perception can be assuaged and relieved.
Fourth, the response to acts of violence on college campuses has historically been
reactive in nature rather than proactive. The Virginia Tech shootings are the most notable
example of late. The shooter was previously known to many entities across the campus. The
warning signs were many, yet there was no intervention. A proactive approach would enable
assessment teams to analyze and discern between behaviors and warning signs that are indicative
of actual future violent actions and those behaviors that do not tend to lead to any affirmative
violent action. The problem with the Virginia Tech incident was that there was not a central
screening administrative body on campus to link all these indicators together and act
accordingly. Deisinger et al. (2008) emphasized that these problems are “typical of the problems
and weaknesses regarding information sharing and follow-up at institutions across the country”
(p. 16).
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Policy Analysis and Research Questions
As a starting point for this analysis, a rational approach was used for direction in order to
develop and implement a policy and protocol regarding community college campus threat
assessments. According to Wildavsky (1979), “Policy analysis is about the realm of rationality
and responsibility where resources relate to the goals. Rationality resides in connecting what
you want with what you can do, and responsibility in being accountable for making that
connection” (p. 18). Michigan community colleges should implement campus threat assessment
policies in the event a threat of violence is made. Community colleges should have a proactive
approach to identify and resolve any potential acts of violence on college premises. It should be
a policy that can actually be implemented, administered, and managed. Furthermore, Stone
(2002) stated:
In the rational model, stated objectives are the standard by which possible actions are
evaluated. To serve the purpose, goals must be known to the decision-maker, explicitly
formulated and fixed. If the decision-maker could not articulate a goal, could not
formulate it precisely enough to know whether it had been achieved, or changed his or
her mind about goals frequently, there could be no stable standard of reference by which
to judge the effectiveness of proposed alternatives. Explicitness and precision about
goals are, therefore, not only virtues, but necessities in the analytic model. (p. 100)
Based on this rational approach and central to the objectives of this study, community
colleges should implement and evaluate their campus threat assessment policies. Bardach’s
(2016) policy problem solving will be used to analyze these efforts and includes the following
process: (1) define problem, (2) assemble evidence, (3) construct alternatives, (4) select criteria,
(5) project outcomes; (6) confront trade-offs, (7) decide, and, finally, (8) tell the story. This
framework is noted for its practical manner of walking policymakers through the process of
policy development and analysis.
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Bardach’s work does not delve deeply into theory but, again, provides a very practical
interpretation of what a policymaker considers when developing policy. In short, Bardach
argued that policymakers must define the problem and gather evidence before constructing
alternatives. His work speaks to potential difficulties in gathering information; it recommends
using both documents and individuals but acknowledges extracting information from people is
often limited by the structural bureaucracy of what they feel comfortable divulging. Then, with
these alternatives in mind, policymakers must select criteria for comparison and project potential
outcomes (whether positive or negative). They must address the trade-offs and share these
before they make their recommendation.
The first step, define the problem, also known as the problem identification, has already
been established in this paper. The problem is the potential threat of violence against students,
staff, and faculty on community college property as well as off-campus and the possible lack of a
policy and procedure in place to prevent or manage such an occurrence.
Second, assemble evidence involves providing data to support the problem being defined.
This is usually done by reviewing Clery data and other local, state, and federal crime reporting.
In addition, searching and collecting media reports of campus violence can be used in this phase.
This can be at times difficult to accomplish, especially when no prior research has been
conducted specific to the problem defined. With the problem of campus violence prevention,
considerable literature is available exploring the nature of campus violence, rates of campus
violence, and alternatives to mitigate threats; however, no research thus far has been conducted
to analyze the policy process utilized at the community college level. An educated guess could
be made that most community colleges have implemented some sort of threat assessment policy;

9
however, this has not been qualified or quantified to date. One of the purposes of the current
research is to begin filling this particular void.
Third, constructing alternatives involves deciding what policy alternatives are available,
which one to use, and weighing the risks and benefits of the alternatives. This is where the limits
of structural bureaucracy come in to play. Based on the recommendations by the Virginia Tech
Review Panel (2007), one solution is implementing a campus threat assessment policy and
procedure. The benefits include having a proactive and objective method of threat assessment
and subsequent management, resulting in safer community college campuses. The risks involved
include the potential for subjectivity and bias in the assessment process. In addition, risks could
include the cursory identification of students at an academic institution simply because of their
physical appearance, their demographics, or their noticeable mental health problems, rather than
relying on the facts of the situation and objective assessment of those facts.
Fourth, select criteria involves determining what methods will be used to determine the
outcomes of the policy option selected. Since the current study is focused on the process of
campus threat assessment, it would seem that process values would be a desirable method to
incorporate, as Bardach (2016) stated, “American democracy values process and procedure is
having a say in the policy issues that affect you and include rationality, openness and
accessibility, transparency, fairness, nonarbitrariness—as well as substance” (pp. 33-34). The
concept of threat assessment includes all these values; however, without seeking to qualify these
values through thoughtful inquiry with stakeholders of the process, it will not lead us to the
outcomes desired for threat assessment. In the case of this study, the selection of criteria relates
to the evaluation of the adequacy and impact of community college threat assessment policies.
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The fifth step is project outcomes, or the impact the policy alternative(s) will have for all
stakeholders involved. No one can predict the future 100% of the time. Policy, as Bardach
(2016) indicated, “is about the future, not the past or the present” (p. 47). Hence, policymakers,
or, in this case, community college administrators, must be realistic in their projected outcomes
with threat assessment protocols. One realistic projected outcome would be that an institution
properly identifies, evaluates, and mitigates potential acts of violence that may include active
shootings, physical and sexual assaults, robberies, and emergency interventions by campus
police. Another realistic projected outcome would be no loss of life or grievous injury to others.
In addition, a mere reduction of incidents is a favorable outcome.
Sixth, confronting the trade-offs means weighing the pros and cons of each altenative and
addressing deviations in the project outcomes an institution is aiming for. With the current
problem of mitigating potential acts of violence at community college campuses, a serious tradeoff to confront is the situation in which an actual act of violence was not prevented, even though
the person of interest was evaluated through the threat assessment process. Although the
incident was not entirely prevented, the trade-off included the fact that no act of violence
occurred because campus law enforcement intervened immediately to end the event and properly
secure all campus areas impacted by the incident.
Seventh, decide refers to the actual decision to implement a certain policy, but also
suggests an internal check of how well the decision-makers have done their work to a certain
point. Bardach (2016) stated that “unless you can convince yourself of the plausibility of some
course of action, you probably won’t be able to convince your client” (p. 69).
The eighth step is to tell the story by presenting to a body of stakeholders the policy
initiative at hand. Stakeholders must be enlisted through the entire policy process, as the threat
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assessment team attempts to provide justification for implementation, to obtain funding, or to
simply educate. For the implementation of campus threat policies, community college
administrators will need to articulate that the campus threat assessment policy and procedure will
be objectively and thoroughly followed, without bias or prejudice. It must be reinforced that the
structure of the process is sound and universal. Objectivity should be built into the assessment
questions.
Therefore, the following research questions will be examined:
1. How have Michigan community colleges implemented campus threat assessment
protocols according to Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis?
2. How have Michigan community colleges evaluated the outcomes of campus threat
assessment policies?
3. What adjustments and improvements are suggested by applying Bardach’s (2016)
Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis to the findings?
This chapter has presented an introduction to the research subject by providing a
statement of the problem, the significance of the research, and the research questions and
analysis to be conducted in the study.
The following chapter presents a review of the literature pertinent to the subject of
campus threat assessment. It includes previous research about campus violence, campus threat
assessment protocols, policy initiatives, and other studies focusing on quantitative and qualitative
topics related to campus threat assessment.

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
To provide further basis for this research endeavor and to build upon what has already
been analyzed, a review of relevant literature pertaining to campus violence, threat assessments,
previous policy initiatives, and quantitative/qualitative research was conducted. Although the
topic of campus violence has been in the global forefront through the many incidents and media
coverage over the past decade, it is necessary to further define and clarify what campus violence
is in order to fully comprehend from an administrative perspective what problem-solving is
necessary. Thus, the literature review begins with campus violence research.
Campus Violence
Gifford, Pregliasco, and Mardas (2002) stated that “crime and violence have become
societal issues, and as incidents of violence occur in society, they will undoubtedly occur on
college and university campuses” (p. 9). In agreement with this statement, Fleenor (2009)
indicated campus violence continues to be a problem in today’s world. Colleges and universities
struggle to address the demands for accountability and improved safety and search for
improvements by revising campus safety policies and procedures to better protect the entire
campus community. Also in agreement are Dahl, Bonham, and Reddington (2016), who
indicated that community colleges are just as prone to acts of violence as 4-year institutions,
citing the 2015 shooting at Umpqua Community College in Oregon, and the 2013 shootings that
took place at the Community College of Philadelphia and Lone Star Community College in
Texas.
12
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Violence is defined as “behavior by persons against persons that intentionally threatens,
attempts, or actually inflicts physical harm” (Reiss & Roth, 1993, p. 35). The World Health
Organization report (Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, & Lozano, 2002) further defines violence as
the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself,
another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high
likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or
deprivations. (p. 4)
A phenomenological study conducted by Mayhew, Caldwell, and Goldman (2011)
explored the essence of campus violence. This study examined just one institution. The
university had approximately 12,000 students and was located in a town of 100,000 residents in
the southeastern area of the United States. The main research question explored the essence of
campus violence. The researchers used the phenomenological approach to “explore, understand,
and verify ideas expressed by the sample population” (p. 257). The study produced a range of
definitions of campus violence but also identified limitations as well, due to the reality that the
sample consisted of self-identified stakeholders, most of whom were administrators with prior
experience with violent acts on campus. The researchers clearly articulated that different
definitions and themes would have emerged if a particular subset of the campus population, such
as female or first-year students, had been interviewed instead.
As Whitaker and Pollard (2014) summarized, one case in particular thrust the issues of
campus violence to the attention of public administrators and politicians. This was the rape and
murder in 1986 of Jeanne Ann Clery, a freshman at Lehigh University, a 4-year institution
located in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. Because of this incident, her parents led the initiative to
raise awareness and to prevent campus violence. Their efforts culminated in the nation’s first
campus crime statistics and security reporting laws, such as the Student-Right-to-Know and
Campus Security Act of 1990 and eventually the Clery Act of 1998. In the Clery case, the act of
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violence was committed by a fellow student while Jeanne Ann Clery slept in her dorm room. As
Bennett (2015) affirmed, campus violence, more often than not, comes from a member of the
campus community. More than half of the incidents of campus violence occurred due to current
or previous intimate relationships, refused advances, obsession, or sexual violence.
In recent times, however, the Virginia Tech shooting massacre has been the most
recognized example of violence in a higher education setting and the impetus for many colleges
and universities to take a discerning look at their campus threat assessment procedures with the
intent of finding proactive approaches to prevent similar tragedies from occurring on their
campuses. Davies (2008) provided a succinct overview of the Virginia Tech campus shootings:
On the morning of April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho, a senior at Virginia Tech, shot and
killed two people in West Ambler Johnston residence hall shortly after 7:00 a.m. He then
returned to his own residence hall, changed from his bloody clothes, and left again.
University and city police, plus emergency rescue teams, quickly cordoned off the crime
scene and began to search for the killer and any evidence that he might have left behind.
Cho blended in with the normal flow of students and staff for the next two hours, except
for a trip to the Blacksburg post office. There he mailed to the NBC network a set of
writings and videotapes expressing contempt for his fellow students as privileged,
spoiled, and morally corrupted by a materialistic society. He also mailed a letter to the
English Department, where he was a major, criticizing a faculty member for being treated
poorly. Shortly after 9:00 a.m. classes began, Cho entered Norris Hall—which has a mix
of classrooms, offices, and laboratories—carrying two semi-automatic handguns, about
400 rounds of ammunition, a hammer, and a knife. He chained the main doors shut from
the inside and began entering classrooms on the second floor, shooting anyone he saw.
According to survivors, he said nothing and showed no emotion. A student placed a 9-11 call, and the first police were on the scene in three minutes. Five minutes later they had
blasted the lock off an unchained door. Two police teams attacked; they didn't know
whether there was one shooter or several, because they could hear two different caliber
guns being fired. Almost immediately on hearing the blast of the shotgun that took the
lock off the door, Cho killed himself. Had the police not entered the building so quickly,
more people would have been killed. Cho still had about 200 unused bullets when he
died. The police continued their search of the building, while emergency rescue and
medical teams began to triage and evacuate the wounded. No one who was alive when
they were triaged died, and several lives were saved by rapid emergency medical action.
But by then 30 more people, 25 students and five faculty were dead—plus, of course,
Cho himself. In little more than two hours, 33 people had died, and 17 were wounded.
Still others were injured jumping from windows. An unknown number of people who
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were directly or indirectly involved will carry the experience with them for the rest of
their lives. (pp. 9-10)
This extreme act of violence made such a profound impact on higher education decisionmakers to redirect resources to campus safety initiatives and rewrite longstanding policies that it
is a necessary component in setting the stage for the remainder of this study. Based on Davies’
summary alone, it is clear that there were several warning signs for potential violence from Mr.
Cho, as well as lost opportunities for proactive interventions. These signs were not collectively
evaluated in a unified effort to assess the true degree and validity of the threat presented by Mr.
Cho, and therefore opportunities were missed. In agreement, Hope (2016) indicated that Mr.
Cho had clear mental health issues that administrators and others missed primarily because
people were not communicating relevant information to one another.
Ten years before Virginia Tech, a qualitative case study (Asmussen & Creswell, 1995)
was conducted over an 8-month period after a campus shooting occurred at an unnamed large
Midwestern university in the mid-1990s. The sample consisted of on-campus only stakeholders.
An open-ended interview was administered to discover themes. One of the primary themes that
emerged consistent with the current research endeavor is the necessity of having a campus-wide
plan to mitigate future acts of violence. Much of this theme dealt with the lack of a centralized
system to bring appropriate stakeholders together to access the threat of violence, keep lines of
communication open, and require cross-departmental cooperation and coordination. So even by
the mid-1990s, based on the Asmussen and Creswell research, there was support for a
defragmented and more unified system to address pre and post acts of violence. Although it was
not called campus threat assessment at the time, the resounding description of what was needed
holds true to campus threats assessment policy invoked post 2007.
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In support of the themes determined by the Asmussen and Creswell (1995) study, a case
study conducted by Kelsey (2007) focused on three institutions of varying size and
demographics: a large urban institution, an institution in a suburban area, and one located in a
rural community. Each of these institutions experienced an act of violence on their respective
campuses, which echoed similar themes. Those themes included the necessity for the
enhancement of communication and a campus threat assessment team to coordinate efforts to
prevent or manage future acts of violence. The Kelsey study also concluded that ongoing staff
training was necessary if the process of open communication was to be enhanced for all
stakeholders to understand the threat assessment process and other mechanisms that each campus
relies on in response to violence.
Some acts of violence are unpredictable, but as the public has learned through media
coverage of the Virginia Tech event and other violent acts, many of these behaviors were
predictable; however, specific information about a particular threat was not connected and
evaluated to properly intervene in a timely manner to prevent or manage the impending violent
behavior (Bennett, 2015). In addition, there is the challenge of determining which individuals
with traits similar to the Virginia Tech perpetrator are likely to be a shooter versus those who are
not likely but are much more numerous. Unfortunately, as Pezza and Bellotti (1995) pointed out,
all too often higher education administrators rely on mistaken beliefs about campus violence.
These mistaken beliefs include, but are not limited to: (a) perpetrators are mentally ill, (b) drugs
and alcohol make people violent, (c) sexual urges make people more prone to violence, and
(d) love conquers all. Furthermore, as Sutton (2016) indicated, college administrators must
confront three main challenges associated with campus violence: (a) sexual assault that requires
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misconduct education and prevention; (b) substance abuse on campus, specifically alcohol,
marijuana, and prescription drugs; and (c) threat management.
However, in addressing the need for improved safety on college campuses, an
understanding of the veritable elements that contribute to campus violence is necessary (Marcus
& Swett, 2002). In agreement with this, the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of
Education (2002), five years before the Virginia Tech event, identified several commonalities
with regard to campus violence actions. First, incidents of target violence are rarely spur-of-themoment or impulsive behaviors; rather, such acts are planned in advance. Second, prior to most
acts of violence, other people had knowledge about the perpetrator’s thoughts or plan to commit
violence. Third, most attackers did not make threats directly before the actual attack. Fourth,
there is no accurate or reliable profile of a person who will engage in an act of violence. Fifth,
most perpetrators had experienced problems dealing with significant losses or personal failures.
Many had considered or even attempted suicide. Sixth, many perpetrators felt bullied,
persecuted, or injured by others prior to committing an act of violence. Lastly, most perpetrators
had access to and had used weapons prior to an act of violence. Hence, campus violence is a
complex phenomenon that has, unfortunately, beleaguered public administrators, specifically
higher education administrators. “The administration of states, counties, cities, towns, school
districts, public and private higher education systems is stymied by the complexity surrounding
the crisis of violence” (Dupont-Morales, 1995, p. 121).
A significant mixed-methods study conducted by Patton and Gregory (2014) sought to
obtain perceptions of safety at Commonwealth of Virginia community colleges. A survey of
11,161 students brought forth a myriad of student perceptions. The quantitative portion of the
study used a non-experimental survey research design involving electronic surveys. The
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qualitative aspect used a case study design of two Virginia community colleges. Perceptions
included the following:
1. Information sharing between administrators and students should increase. This can
occur through routine surveys administered to students in order to gain their insights
on safety and, in turn, administrators can address the most important issues identified
by students.
2. It was important to students to have a campus security presence during instructional
hours. If this was unattainable due to budgetary restraints, then perhaps interns or
student volunteers could be used in a “watch” system.
3. Administrators should focus on improving lighting in parking lots and walkways.
This was especially concerning at night time.
4. Colleges should take into consideration principles of crime prevention through
environmental design when planning construction of new buildings, parking lots, and
walkways.
5. New student orientation should include information about campus crime statistics and
safety information. This information should also be distributed to part-time students
outside of new student orientation, as many part-time students are unable to attend
such programs.
In yet another mixed-methods study conducted by Hites et al. (2013), a geospatial
method was used to assess campus safety at a large urban campus in the southeast region of the
United States. University administrators in this area of the United States were driven to
determine the perceptions of students with regard to campus safety due to students’ consistently
poor ratings of campus safety. Qualitative data were collected from 10 student focus groups that
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totaled 61 students. Themes from the focus groups included the following: (a) poor
communication or lack of communication about campus safety, (b) little or no student
knowledge regarding the use of campus safety call boxes, (c) a need for greater campus police
presence, (d) a need for improved signage indicating locations that were considered on-campus
versus those consider off-campus, and (e) a need for improved lighting on campus.
The results were similar to the Patton and Gregory (2014) study conducted one year later
and further support the dilemma of campus violence in the higher education setting. The study
also defined and articulated the value of implementing a policy of using campus threat
assessment protocols to recognize, identify, and mitigate threats. Assertions made by the
research included in the literature review are also supported by qualitative research. What is
lacking is the qualification of the campus threat assessment policy process implemented by
institutions of higher education, specifically community colleges, which this dissertation has
attempted to address.
To quantify the crisis of violence, specifically to college students, in a comprehensive
study conducted from 1995–2002, the Violent Victimization of College Students Report (Baum
& Klaus, 2005) showed that 479,000 crimes of violence occurred involving college students ages
18–24. These crimes included rape/sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, and simple
assault. These data included both part-time and full-time students attending public and private
institutions, both 2-year and 4-year. The aggregate data indicated that although the data overall
showed violent crimes down 54%, the most striking outcome was that only 35% of violent acts
were reported to campus police during the study period. The statement that violent crimes have
declined overall or were perhaps underreported is further supported by Clery Act (Jeanne Clery
Disclosure, 1998) data. In agreement with this, Sloan (1994) and Barton, Jensen, and Kaufman
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(2010) indicated that before the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 was passed,
few colleges and universities felt the need to even publicize their crime data. Does this hold true
for Michigan community colleges as well?
In order to gain perspective for the reported level of violence at Michigan community
colleges with student populations of 10,000−15,000, this researcher did a search through the
Clery Act Uniformed Crime Report and obtained five hits. The student population range of
10,000−15,000 was selected because it is the mean student population among the 28 community
colleges in Michigan. The schools that fell into this category were Delta College in Saginaw,
Henry Ford Community College in Dearborn, Mott Community College in Flint, Schoolcraft
College in Livonia, and Washtenaw Community College in Ann Arbor. From 2007−2009, only
18 reported acts of violence occurred among all five of these community colleges; however, Carr
(2007) stated that doubts about the validity and reliability of the data provided by the Clery Act
are commonplace. Hughes, Elliott, and Myers (2014) agreed, indicating that “this underreporting may be due, in large part, to victims either discounting the actual impact of the crime
itself or because they knew the perpetrator and felt it was a personal matter that should be
resolved between the parties themselves” (p. 122).
Among community colleges, the focus of this current study, underreporting is a key
reason why the violent crime data are nominal. Presently there is little research to explore this
assertion. One study that does provide insight into underreporting was conducted by Hart and
Colavito (2011). The outcome of their study reflected a growing sense of apathy on college and
university campuses. In the context of this study, such apathy is defined as the “absence of
interest or concern toward campus crime with the exception of incidents that are viewed as
severe” (p. 9).
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These characteristics may account for the relatively low rates of violence at Michigan
community colleges and may suggest that violence is more prone to occur off-campus than at
residential universities. Community colleges are commuter-based and have a wide variety of
student demographics. There are predominantly no residence halls and, in many cases, no
formal law enforcement entity present on a 24-hour basis (Jaschik, 2013). In contrast to this,
however, Dahl et al. (2016) indicated that community colleges may actually have a more difficult
time identifying potential threats, as most community colleges “only see students for a short
period of time during a week, with no additional contact in nonacademic settings, so in turn
making it tougher when it comes to the detection of students who might need help” (p. 707). The
open door admission policies of most community colleges may also make it more difficult to
identify potential threats. Dahl et al. further stated that “because they are mainly commuter
campuses, there may also be relatively few opportunities for students and faculty to build
relationships that could detect troubling changes in behavior” (p. 708).
Although the literature suggests that the threat of campus violence may be nominal, it is
nonetheless a potential reality in present-day society and on higher education campuses. This is
supported by O’Neill, Fox, Depue, and Englander (2008), who further stated that “although the
risk for mass shootings and other incidents of extreme violence on college and university
campuses is remote, it remains very real and the consequences are devastating to victims,
families, and to the entire campus community” (p. 2). In order to mitigate potential acts of
violence on higher education campuses, policies that promote viable threat assessment protocols
should be implemented. The literature pertaining to threat assessment protocols for higher
education is expansive and will be explored next.
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Campus Violence Threat Assessments
Newman and Fox (2009) studied shooting incidents that occurred at Case Western
Reserve in 2003, Virginia Tech in 2007, Louisiana Tech in 2008, and Northern Illinois
University in 2008. The resounding theme from this study indicated that institutions of higher
education have a considerable challenge to mitigate potential acts of violence. Those challenges
include the following:
There is less to work with in the way of advanced information, more concern about
privacy, and more problematic architectural surroundings. It is harder to get the word out
that a dangerous situation is in progress. It would seem that college officials have to
focus more attention on the identification and treatment of mental illness and, thereafter,
the appropriate level of communication between health authorities and university officials
for intervention to be feasible. (p. 1305)
Again, these last statements support the necessity of threat assessment protocols to
address these concerns, albeit keeping in mind the complexities of any potential act of violence
and, in many cases, the unpredictable aspects of human nature, where perpetrators “have many
different motives and are less likely to warn of their intentions” (Newman & Fox, 2009, p. 1305).
There is a wealth of research supporting the implementation of threat assessment
protocols at institutions of higher education. Some states, including Virginia and Illinois, have
enacted laws requiring all colleges and universities to establish threat assessment teams as well
(Deisinger et al., 2008). In support, Pollard, Nolan, and Deisinger (2012) stated:
The approach is well-tested, implemented in a variety of settings over the past 30 years,
and has been demonstrated to be effective. Threat assessment is recognized by the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) report “A Risk Analysis Standard for
Natural and Man-Made Hazards to Higher Education Institutions” as the standard for the
prevention of targeted on-campus violence (ASME-ITI, 2010). The standard was
developed as part of the ongoing efforts by the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, of which ANSI is a part, at the behest of the White House after 9/11. The
mission is to develop risk management processes across the country designed to produce
methodologically sound as well as easily implemented risk reduction options. ANSI
standards are often cited in legal cases where no other licensure or codified standard
exists—such as in threat assessment. (p. 264)
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The resounding theme from many of the campus shootings and other acts of violence that
have occurred since the Virginia Tech incident has been that perpetrators provided warning signs
of their impending actions. In agreement, Greenlee (2016) indicated that the student shooter had
numerous interactions with a variety of departments and people, yet there was no crossdiscussion amongst these entities. They never communicated with each other about the red flags.
As Greenlee further stated, “If they had gotten together and talked about what was happening
with that individual, there was a possibility that they may have been able to intercede before
something happened” (p. 18). Hollister and Scalora (2015) also supported this by stating, “In
general, criminological reviews, threatening statements, physical aggression, and harassing
behavior have corresponded with increased likelihood of subsequent violence” (p. 46). What
appeared to be lacking from these types of behaviors was a process in place to identify, assess,
and prevent or manage potential acts of violence. These statements are supported by Keller et al.
(2011), who also indicated that “what appears to be lacking is a process for both early detection
of individuals who engage in behavior that is either potentially alarming or threatening and
effective intervention before this behavior becomes a high profile, full-blown crisis” (p. 77).
This brings us to the concept of threat assessment as a means of preventing or managing
potential acts of violence. Systematic threat assessment is an optimal strategy for determining
the creditability and seriousness of a threat and the likelihood that it will be carried out
(Jimerson, Brock, & Cowan, 2005). Like the studies by Asmussen and Creswell (1995) and
Kelsey (2007), the Mayhew et al. (2011) study also concluded that threat assessment teams were
a necessity to coordinate information of potential threat, assess the validity and severity of the
threat, and implement a prevention or management plan. This statement is further supported by
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a Pavela (2008) interview with Dr. Gene Deisinger of Iowa State University, an expert in the
implementation of threat assessment protocols. In the interview, Dr. Deisinger explained that
threat assessments are a safety management tool that is based on information and
observations about a specific situation. Threat assessment focuses on a subject’s
behavior and information about the situation to determine the likelihood of escalation in
behavior. A threat assessment is a dynamic process, recognizing that threat levels are
affected by a number of variables, many of which change over time and as interventions
or stressors are modified. The purpose of a threat assessment is to anticipate reasonably
foreseeable actions of a specified person, or to anticipate likely changes in a specific
situation. The assessment allows for early identification of situations that are likely to
pose a risk, provides a baseline against which to measure changes in the situation, and
facilitates development and implementation of interventions to increase likelihood of a
safe resolution. (p. 2)
With threat assessment fully defined, the method of administering the process itself is
through the formulation of a threat assessment team. A campus threat assessment team involves
representatives from the respective college or university assembled and available as needed to
review identified potential acts of violence. This team should consist of a cross-section of
personnel including administrators, staff, and faculty. Specifically, the team should include
representatives from public safety or campus law enforcement, the dean of students, the student
conduct officer, faculty, counselors, legal counsel, and at least one executive-level administrator
(Cornell, 2010).
Such teams are often called Student Cares Committees or Behavior Intervention Teams.
According to Deisinger et al. (2008), the assessment team “is perhaps the most critical tool that a
college or university can use to prevent targeted violence on campus, as well as identify and
intervene with other problems that affect the health and well-being of the campus community”
(p. 14). The team or committee can meet weekly, biweekly, monthly, or as needed. The team or
committee must be vested with the authority to review and discuss any students, staff, or faculty
who have raised concerns or may be at risk of harming either themselves or others, or who pose
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a significant disruption to the learning environment. The team may receive and evaluate all
reports of threatening or other alarming behaviors by any student, staff, or faculty.
There are essentially four basic steps entrusted to the threat assessment team: (1) identify
threats, (2) evaluate the seriousness of the threat, (3) intervene to reduce the risk of violence, and
(4) follow up to monitor and re-evaluate effectiveness of the safety plan (Cornell, 2010). In
keeping with these basic steps, Randazzo and Plummer (2009) indicated that information sharing
through open lines of communication is essential to properly identify a threat, evaluate the risk,
intervene accordingly, and monitor the effectiveness in the prevention or management of
potential threats of violence. Open communication is critical in the reduction or elimination of
information silos that can exist in higher education organizations.
In agreement with the steps outlined by Cornell (2010), the authors of Campus Violence
Prevention and Response: Best Practices for Massachusetts High Education (O’Neill et al.,
2008) asserted that threat assessment teams must be given the authority and capacity to draw
upon all available resources as needed to evaluate potential acts of violence. O’Neill et al.
further stated that “the team should be empowered to take actions such as conducting additional
investigation, gathering background information, identifying warning signs, establishing a threat
potential risk, and properly administering preventative or management plans” (p. 45). For this to
occur, strategic-minded leadership must see the need for policy initiatives that provide such
empowerment. Therefore, effective policy implementation is crucial for assessment teams to be
initiated and granted the necessary resources and authority to be effective.
Policy Initiatives
The primary research question is to ascertain if community colleges in Michigan already
have threat assessment policies. As Gomez (2015) indicated, “If there are no formalized policies
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and procedures in place, get to work in creating some. Having those will ensure that the threat
assessment process is consistent and impartial” (p. 6). In agreement, Crawford and Burns (2015)
stated:
Schools at all levels of education have sought to better prepare for, prevent, and respond
to school shootings and other forms of violence. Several high-profile mass murders and
various other shootings and violent acts, most notably toward the latter part of the 1990’s
and early/middle 2000’s, generated various legislative acts, school policies, and
prevention efforts to address concerns regarding school violence. (p. 631)
As a starting point for most policy initiations, the initiative mandated to all institutions of
higher education is the Clery Act (Jeanne Clery Disclosure, 1990). The Jeanne Clery Disclosure
of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, codified at 20 USC 1092(f) as a
part of the Higher Education Act of 1965, is a federal law requiring colleges and universities to
disclose certain timely and annual information about campus crime and security policies. All
public and private institutions of postsecondary education participating in federal student aid
programs are subject to this law. Violators can be fined up to $27,500 or face other enforcement
action by the U.S. Department of Education, the agency charged with enforcement of the Act and
where complaints of alleged violations should be made. The Clery Act, originally enacted by the
Congress and signed into law by President George Bush in 1990 as the Crime Awareness and
Campus Security Act of 1990, was championed by Howard and Connie Clery after their
daughter Jeanne was murdered at Lehigh University in 1986. They also founded the non-profit
Security On Campus, Inc., in 1987. Amendments to the Act in 1998 renamed it in memory of
Jeanne Clery (Summary of the Jeanne Clery Act, 2016).
The Clery Act (1990) mandates that schools have to publish an annual report every year
by October 1st containing three years of campus crime statistics and certain security policy
statements, including sexual assault policies that assure victims’ basic rights, the law
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enforcement authority of campus police, and where students should report crimes. The report is
to be made available automatically to all current students and employees, while prospective
students and employees are to be notified of its existence and afforded an opportunity to request
a copy. Schools can comply by using the Internet as long as the required recipients are notified
and provided the exact Internet address for the report, and paper copies must be available upon
request. A copy of the statistics must also be provided to the U.S. Department of Education.
The Clery Act (1990) also states that each school must disclose crime statistics not only
for the campus, but also for unobstructed public areas immediately adjacent to or running
through the campus and for certain non-campus facilities, including Greek housing and remote
classrooms. The statistics must be obtained from campus police or security, local law
enforcement, or other school officials, such as student judicial affairs directors, who have
significant responsibility for student and campus activities. Professional mental health and
religious counselors are exempt from reporting obligations but may refer patients to a
confidential reporting system, and the school must indicate whether it has such a system.
Crimes are reported in the following seven major categories, with several subcategories:
(1) Criminal Homicide, specified as (a) Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter, and (b)
Negligent Manslaughter; (2) Sex Offenses, specified as (a) Forcible Sex Offenses (including
rape), and (b) Non-forcible Sex Offenses; (3) Robbery; (4) Aggravated Assault; (5) Burglary; (6)
Motor Vehicle Theft; and (7) Arson.
Schools are also required to report the following three types of incidents if they result in
either an arrest or disciplinary referral: (1) Liquor Law Violations, (2) Drug Law Violations, and
(3) Illegal Weapons Possession. If both an arrest and referral are made, only the arrest is
counted.
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The statistics are also categorized geographically as on campus, residential student
facilities on campus, non-campus buildings, or on public property such as streets and sidewalks.
Schools can use a map to denote these areas. The report must also indicate if any of the reported
incidents, or any other crime involving bodily injury, was a hate crime.
Finally, the Clery Act (1990) requires schools to provide timely warnings and a separate,
more extensive public crime log. These requirements are most likely to affect the day-to-day
lives of students. The timely warning requirement is somewhat subjective and narrower in
scope. It is triggered only when the school considers a crime to pose an ongoing threat to
students and employees. In contrast, the public crime log records all incidents reported to the
campus police or security department. Timely warnings cover a broader source of reports
(campus police or security, other campus officials, and off-campus law enforcement) than the
crime log but are limited to those crime categories required in the annual report. The crime log
includes only incidents reported to the campus police or security department but covers all
crimes, not just those required in the annual report, which means crimes like theft are included in
the log. State crime definitions may be used.
Schools that maintain a police or security department are required to disclose in the
public crime log any crime that occurs on campus or within the patrol jurisdiction of the campus
police or the campus security department and that is reported to the campus police or security
department. The log is required to include the nature, date, time, and general location of each
crime as well as its disposition, if known. Incidents are to be included within two business days,
but certain limited information may be withheld to protect victim confidentiality, ensure the
integrity of ongoing investigations, or keep a suspect from fleeing or eluding. Only the most
limited information necessary may be withheld, and even then it must be released once the
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adverse effect is no longer likely to occur. The log must be publicly available during normal
business hours. This means that, in addition to students and employees, the general public, such
as parents or members of the local press, may access it. Logs remain open for 60 days and
subsequently must be available within two business days of a request (Summary of the Jeanne
Clery Act, 2016).
Since 1990, the Clery Act has been the starting point for institutions of higher education
to implement policies regarding campus safety and threat prevention. However, have institutions,
specifically community colleges, made strides to adhere to this mandate? McIntire (2015)
indicated that large, residential institutions of higher education have greatly increased safety and
security preparedness since 2007, while community colleges and smaller institutions of higher
education have not followed suit, should something such as an act of violence occur. In contrast,
however, community colleges in the Commonwealth of Virginia, due to state law, have widely
embraced threat assessment policy initiatives. As Johnson (2016) indicated, several community
colleges in Virginia have implemented a threat policy platform to “help manage and coordinate
threat assessment team efforts, saving time and resources while improving collaboration and
information sharing” (p. 36).
After the Virginia Tech incident in 2007, a review panel was convened to analyze the
events that transpired as a starting point for a policy change initiative. The panel was
empowered by then-Governor Kaine with the authority to interview all stakeholders related to
the incident. The panel had access to all records pertaining to the shooter as well. Three themes
emerged from the interviews of more than 200 people: (1) Structural—the underlying systems of
public health and public safety provided by governmental agencies, (2) Management by the
university and government—what was done or not done by top decision makers, and (3) Actions
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on the ground—what was done at the scenes by medical and victim-survivor services (Davies,
2008). Further administrative and legal actions occurring in the aftermath of the tragedy
included Virginia Tech implementing its own threat assessment process in 2008. Janosik and
Gregory (2009) agreed that the policy initiatives by Governor Kaine were important in order to
facilitate change at the state and national levels, particularly “to seek training, change, and
positive efforts to work together” (p. 225). Shortly after that action, the Commonwealth of
Virginia passed a law requiring all of Virginia’s public colleges and universities to form panels
with the authority to investigate students’ academic, medical, and criminal records, with panel
findings being exempt from public disclosure laws (DiMaria, 2012).
Following the results of the Virginia Tech Panel Review, other institutions of higher
education made it a priority to review and revise their respective campus policies for dealing
with violence (Mastrodicasa, 2008). One of the central outcomes of institutional reviews was the
necessity for sharing responsibility for gathering and disseminating information through the
inclusion of a diverse group of stakeholders (Scalora et al., 2010). As we have learned, the
mechanism for this information sharing is the formation of campus threat assessment policies
and procedures. Continued support for this necessity is provided by Fox and Savage (2009),
who stated that “the establishment of a multidisciplinary team to respond to threats and other
dangerous behaviors can be extremely helpful in identifying potential problem students and
guiding them toward the help they need” (p. 1471).
Despite the value of implementing threat assessment policy initiatives, the question arises
as to whether the assessment process can eliminate all acts of violence. Two examples would
indicate the answer is no. Maher (2014) indicated that, in 2009, two years after the first extreme
act of violence at Virginia Tech, a graduate student at Virginia Tech beheaded a female student
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who had rebuffed his romantic advances. In addition, in 2012, a threat assessment team was in
place at the University of Colorado where James Holmes was enrolled. Holmes was recently
convicted of several murders for the Aurora, Colorado, movie theater massacre in the summer of
2012. Holmes made threats to staff members but left the university shortly after, making followup and monitoring difficult, if not impossible. In addition to missed signals or perhaps the lack
of vigilance, it is challenging to prove that having a threat assessment policy makes colleges and
universities safer. It is difficult to quantify events that do not occur, and difficult to measure the
absence of incidents.
In conjunction with this view, Pezza (1995) indicated that college and university
communities must recognize that those taking action are proceeding more intuitively than some
might like, and that expectations for success may need to be modest. Furthermore, Maher (2014)
interviewed Dr. Gene Deisinger, who agreed with Maher’s statements by indicating that “there
are no standards for how to report a successful case, and privacy concerns make data sharing
complicated.” In agreeing that privacy concerns can encumber the threat assessment process,
Eells and Rockland-Miller (2011) indicated that fear of lawsuit through the violation of the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) is pervasive. This law protects the privacy
of student records, mandating that colleges and universities cannot share information internally
or externally. An exception exists, however, if it can be shown that the information is necessary
to protect the health or safety of students or other persons and has a legitimate educational
interest. In that circumstance, institutions are protected against violation of this law.
As the literature conveys, the primary outcome of a threat assessment policy initiative is
to identify, assess, prevent, and manage a threat of violence on a college campus. In agreement,
Randazzo and Plummer (2009) indicated that many questions need to be addressed in evaluating
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the type of policy initiative. First, Randazzo and Plummer asked, how do college and university
stakeholders, planners of school safety, and crisis response programs respond to and interpret the
results of a campus threat assessment? The procedural questions that are asked in order to assess
the potential threat level are objective and rely on the information gathered in the investigative
phase. What is not known from a research standpoint is how the responsible parties may
disengage from the potential internal and external responses of the assessment and proposed
outcomes.
Second, Randazzo and Plummer (2009) asked, how do assessment teams respond to data
or information garnered from the assessment that does or does not fit their preconceptions about
campus threats of violence? Preconceptions should not be involved because the assessment team
will not have prior knowledge of the potential threat of violence. From the onset of involvement
in a campus threat assessment plan, team members should leave any personal interests or
agendas out of the process. According to Ciulla (2004),
It is a fact of organizational life that participants get preoccupied with their own interests
and aims. This has certain negative consequences, such as unproductive conflict and
depletion of resources. To avoid these consequences, it is necessary to unify
organizational members by refocusing their attention on collective goals. (p. 153)
Third, Randazo and Plummber (2009) asked, how do actual assessment findings affect
the thinking about campus safety and crisis response planning and management? The campus
threat assessment team, entrusted by the institutional administration to effectively and efficiently
assess a potential threat of campus violence, must remain objective in its assessment of a
potential threat. To evaluate this particular question, however, a researcher would need to
candidly interview each team member to gather such information. This would be a necessary
and logical step in policy evaluation.

33
The final intended outcome would be whether the management plan is effective. If an act
of violence is prevented, then the answer is obvious. Having an effective plan means more than
this, and as Deisinger et al. (2008) stated,
The plan should be based upon the information gathered in the threat assessment inquiry,
and tailored to address the problems of the person in question. Threat management is
more art than science. It focuses both on addressing what is already working for the
person of concern, and creatively searching for resources, both on and off campus, that is
available to help move the person away from thoughts and plans of violence and get
assistance to address underlying problems. (p. 105)
More importantly with this aspect, if the individual or individuals being assessed are
treated with respect and dignity in the outcome, then the process is considered effective.
Unfortunately, in certain scenarios of campus violence, it may be unavoidable that law
enforcement and the use of force are utilized to prevent the act of violence. However, as this
policy intends, many other interventions can be implemented to resolve the potential threat,
interventions that do not require the use of force against an individual. These include, but are not
limited to, direct engagement of the individual or individuals; mandated internal counseling; or
external counseling, therapy, and psychological assessment (Deisinger et al., 2008). In
agreement, Hope (2016) indicated that administrators can create threat assessment teams that
include personnel from public safety, public health, and administration to “identify students who
might need support for mental health issues and to provide support in a comprehensive and
ongoing way” (p. 1). There is also merit in including stakeholders such as students, faculty, and
staff in the implementation of new policy initiatives to address campus violence. Schafer, Lee,
Burress, and Giblin (2016) indicated that college policymakers may obtain input only from
representative bodies such as student government or the faculty union. This method provides a
cost-effective way to secure broader input, support, understanding, and recognition of what a
particular campus threat assessment policy is trying to achieve.
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The following chapter addresses the methodology used to collect data and to address the
research questions of this study.

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
To guide the exploration of policies and procedures to minimize community college
campus violence, a mixed-methods research approach using a Likert-scale questionnaire with
follow-up supporting questions was used. Many factors contributed to the decision to use a
mixed-methods study approach. In general, this approach adds three important elements to the
research: (1) it allows the individual voices of participants to be heard, (2) it allows for
comprehensive analyses of phenomena, and (3) it allows for enhanced validity of findings
(Chaumba, 2013). Furthermore, Creswell and Plano Clark (2007) elaborated that triangulation,
concurrent, or parallel design entails separate quantitative and qualitative data collection and
analysis within the same timeframe and merging of data during interpretation for various reasons
that may include validating findings from one method, gaining a complete understanding of
phenomenon under study, or confirming findings.
Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis was the framework used for
community colleges to apply to their own unique situations. This framework is noted for its
practical manner of walking policymakers through the process of policy development and
analysis. Bardach’s work does not delve deeply into theory but, again, provides a very practical
interpretation of what a policymaker considers when developing policy. In short, Bardach
argued that policymakers must define the problem and gather evidence before constructing
alternatives. The policy analysis framework speaks to potential difficulties in gathering
information. It recommends using both documents and individuals but acknowledges that
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extracting information from people is often limited by the structural bureaucracy of what they
feel comfortable divulging. Then, with these alternatives in mind, policymakers must select
criteria for comparison and project potential outcomes (whether positive or negative). They must
address the trade-offs and share these before they make their recommendation.
Bardach’s method determined the prevalence of threat teams and protocols at the
community college level and, in turn, improved the understanding of this particular policy
problem for community college administrators. The mixed-methods study also addressed the
research questions associated with the issue of how the information used in a campus threat
assessment is processed and applied to the prevention or management of a campus violence
threat. Potential threats of violence include not only weapon-involved threats, such as the use of
guns or knives, but also robberies, rapes, domestic violence, and even simple assaults. There
may be other identified threats that could have an impact on campus safety as well, such as
citizens in the community who have communicated in some manner their intent to do harm on
campus.
The research emphasis is further solidified by restating the dependent and independent
variables associated with the research questions:
1. How have Michigan community colleges implemented campus threat assessment
protocols according to Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis?
2. How have Michigan community colleges evaluated the outcomes of campus threat
assessment policies?
3. What policy adjustments and improvements are suggested by applying Bardach’s
method to the findings?
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The variable for Question 1 is that policy implementation is strengthened by the use of Bardach’s
analysis process. For Question 2, the variable is that the use of campus threat assessments at
Michigan community colleges will reduce violent acts. For Question 3, the variable is that the
use of Bardach’s method in the policy review process strengthens the ability of community
college administrators to effectively review and revise their campus threat assessment policies
and procedures in a structured and meaningful manner.
Bardach’s (2016) framework is a good fit for this type of research, as the focus is to
examine how each community college applied this framework to its own situation. Bardach
emphasized that assembling evidence is essential in policy problem solving and that “consulting
people is crucial in collecting information, data, and ideas” (p. 83). For this study, a Likert-scale
questionnaire with open-ended follow-up questions was used to assemble this evidence. Each
survey question is structured to mirror each step of Bardach’s process.
Setting
The setting for this study was 27 community colleges in the state of Michigan. There are
actually 28 community colleges in Michigan, the 28th being Kalamazoo Valley Community
College. However, the researcher for this study is also the student conduct administrator at this
institution; therefore, the college was excluded to reduce potential bias. The 27 colleges
provided ample opportunity to identify perspectives from the questionnaire responses, as well as
to conduct cross-case theme analysis. The community colleges participating in this study
included the following:
1. Alpena Community College, Alpena;
2. Bay de Noc Community College, Escanaba;
3. Delta College, Saginaw;

38
4. Glen Oaks Community College, Centreville;
5. Gogebic Community College, Ironwood;
6. Grand Rapids Community College, Grand Rapids;
7. Henry Ford Community College, Dearborn;
8. Jackson College, Jackson;
9. Kellogg Community College, Battle Creek;
10. Kirtland Community College, Roscommon;
11. Lake Michigan College, Benton Harbor;
12. Lansing Community College, Lansing;
13. Macomb Community College, Warren;
14. Mid-Michigan Community College, Harrison;
15. Monroe County Community College, Monroe;
16. Montcalm Community College, Sidney;
17. Mott Community College, Flint;
18. Muskegon Community College, Muskegon;
19. North Central Michigan College, Petoskey;
20. Northwestern Michigan College, Traverse City;
21. Oakland Community College, Auburn Hills;
22. St. Clair County Community College, Port Huron;
23. Schoolcraft College, Livonia;
24. Southwestern Michigan College, Cassopolis;
25. Washtenaw Community College, Ann Arbor;
26. Wayne County Community College District, Detroit;
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27. West Shore Community College, Scottville.
(2013-2014 Activities Classification Structure, 2014)
Pertinent information regarding the enrollment and demographics at the 28 Michigan
community colleges in total can be found in Table 1.

Table 1
Enrollment and Demographic Information at 28 Michigan Community Colleges
Demographic Information
Enrollment
Total
Credit/Program
Non-credit/Non-program
Full-time
Part-time
Student Demographics
Age
Average age
Under 18 years
18-24 years
25-34 years
35-49 years
Over 50 years

Number or Percentage
449,084
226,255
222,829
33.91%
66.09%

26.4 years
7.09%
55.36%
20.07%
12.65%
4.49%

Gender
Women
Men

56.78%
43.22%

Ethnicity
Minorities
White/Non-Hispanic
Black
Hispanic
Asian American
Native America/Alaskan
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander

25.18%
64.45%
17.48%
3.54%
2.09%
0.72%
0.13%
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Table 1—Continued
Demographic Information

Number or Percentage

Other Student Demographics
First generation to attend college
Single parent
Non-U.S. citizen
Veteran
Student with disabilities
Full-time student employed full-time
Full-time student employed part-time
Part-time student employed full time
Part-time students employed part time

36%
17%
7%
4%
12%
22%
40%
41%
32%

Receiving Financial Aid
Pell Grant
Any aid
Federal grant
Federal loan
Institutional aid

33%
58%
38%
19%
13%

Tuition and Fees
Average in-district cost per credit hour
Average out-of-district cost per credit hour

$94.41
$156.00

Degrees and Certificates Awarded
Associate degrees
Certificates

26,741
12.025

Revenue Sources
State funds
Local property taxes
Tuition and fees
Other

19.9%
34.0%
44.6%
2.5%

On-Campus Housing
Available at 7 of the 28 community colleges
Colleges Offering Sports (Competitive Athletics)
19 colleges are members of the National Junior College
Athletic Association
2013-2014 Activities Classification Structure, 2014
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Subjects
The subjects or population that completed the questionnaires included all student conduct
administrators and their direct supervisors at the 27 Michigan community colleges. In most
cases, the direct supervisor was a cabinet or executive-level person. The respondents consisted
of approximately 60 personnel, which included 2 representatives from each of the 27 institutions
included in the sample. One institution, Oakland Community College, has multiple campuses
with different administrators, which explains why there were 60 respondents.
Access
The research was conducted by acquiring contact information through the Association of
Student Conduct Administrators and also contacting the 27 community colleges directly in order
to seek permission and confirm who would respond to the questionnaire.
Initial contact with each institution’s student conduct administrator occurred through a
phone call or email on or about November 1, 2015, indicating who the researcher is, what the
research involved, how the research would be conducted (through the questionnaire and openended follow-up questions), when the research would take place, why the research was being
conducted, and how the information garnered from the questionnaires would be used.
Instrument
A Likert-scale questionnaire with open-ended follow-up questions was used to gather
research data. The questionnaire consisted of 10 items. The open-ended follow-up questions
were asked to add value to the responses on the Likert scale. Question 1 asks whether the survey
participant has a threat assessment policy currently in place at his or her respective institution.
Questions 2 through 9 address how each step of Bardach’s model applies to each institution’s
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policy implementation process. Question 10 is simply a wrap-up that allows the participant to
add additional comments.
Yin (2014) indicated that the use of questionnaires in mixed-methods research is
“targeted—focusing directly on the study topic; insightful—providing explanations as well as
personal views, such as perceptions, attitudes, and meanings” (p. 106). The consent document
and questionnaire were mailed to 60 student conduct administrators at the 27 Michigan
community colleges used for the study via the U.S. Postal Service on November 15, 2015, with a
deadline for responding of December 15, 2015, although several were received up until January
12, 2016. Twenty-one questionnaires were returned, which provided responses to both the
Likert-scale items and the open-ended questions on the survey that resulted in the data analyzed
for this study.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was conducted using the computer software program SPSS 23. The
researcher used an explanatory mixed-methods approach (Creswell, 2008) with quantitative and
qualitative data collected from the survey. The survey consisted of a series of closed and openended responses. Closed-ended items were developed from Bardach’s model and used a 5-point
Likert scale. Open-ended questions used to further explain Likert responses followed each item.
According to Schuman (2008), the value of open-ended questions is mostly interpretive, in that
they help in understanding the meaning of closed-question responses. Data from each
component were analyzed separately and then integrated through the process of triangulation
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).
The quantitative responses were entered into an Excel spreadsheet, then uploaded into
SPSS 23 for analysis. Instrument reliability was determined to be acceptable by using Cronbach
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alpha procedures. Descriptive statistics were generated for each item with frequency by response
option and measures of central tendency (mean and standard deviation).
Content analysis of the comments was conducted using open coding (Strauss & Corbin,
1990) within a matrix of major categories and subcategories (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña,
2014). Open coding entails the initial breakdown of raw text into conceptual categories. These
categories are discrete and detail a particular phenomenon, which, in this study, are the responses
to each survey question. Themes emerge by systematically linking categories to quantitative
findings. The intent of analysis is to find a common core of consensual meanings across
categories yet retain the personal experience. For an analysis to be credible, it must be plausible
and cohesive and correspondence with the data must be demonstrable (Denzin, 1989; Riessman,
1993).
Validity
The primary test of validity focuses on construct validity (Yin, 2014). Two steps must be
met to achieve this level of validity. One, this research must define campus violence in terms of
specific concepts and relate them to the original objectives of this research—that the
implementation of campus threat assessment policy is a means to prevent or manage acts of
violence. Second, the research must identify operational measures that match the concepts. This
is done through the use of Bardach’s Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis to measure how
community colleges have implemented and used campus threat assessment policies and
procedures.
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Risks
There are some identifiable risks to the subjects associated with participation in this
research. Even though the research occurs in an educational setting where participants are
specifically involved in the policy decision-making process, there may be sensitivity or
hesitation to respond openly to the questions. This may be due to acts of violence that have
occurred on some of the campuses that continue to impact the learning environment. The
researcher’s intent was to explain to each respondent during the informed consent process the
purpose and extent of the study and its intended goal to find policy themes that may improve
community college understanding of campus violence and threat assessment policies and
procedures.
This research will provide community college administrators a better understanding of
the policy-decision making process associated with effectively implementing campus threat
assessment protocols at their campuses. Specifically, using Bardach’s Eightfold Path for Policy
Analysis allowed each participant in the mixed-methods study the opportunity to apply this
framework to his or her own unique situation and perhaps use this process for any future policydecision endeavors. The research outcomes were also provided to each participant at the
conclusion of the study.
The data or information acquired for this study may be deemed sensitive. Specific
incidents that may have occurred on participant campuses were not part of the questionnaire.
Identities of participants were protected in the study by not mentioning the names of any
individual respondent and by referring to the community colleges as Community College A,
Community College B, and so forth. All responses and consent documents are stored separately,
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for at least 3 years after the close of the study, in a locked file cabinet at the School of Public
Affairs and Administration, Western Michigan University.
This chapter focused on the methodology that was used to conduct the research for the
current study, including the type of data collection instrument used and that both quantitative and
qualitative data addressed the research questions. Furthermore, this chapter also discussed how
Bardach’s Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis is integrated into the design. The following
chapter will address the research outcomes of both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the
study.

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH OUTCOMES
The outcomes of this study resulted from 21 participants’ responses to a survey
consisting of Likert-scale items and open-ended questions. The survey was mailed to 60 student
conduct administrators at 27 Michigan community colleges on November 15, 2015. Although
the deadline for return was December 15, 2015, several questionnaires were received up until
January 12, 2016.
The following outcomes were determined using SPSS 23 to analyze the quantitative
aspects of the data. The quantitative responses were entered into an Excel spreadsheet, then
uploaded into SPSS 23 for analysis. Instrument reliability was determined to be acceptable by
the Cronbach alpha procedures (α =.95), thus analysis proceeded. Descriptive statistics were
generated for each item with frequency by response option and measures of central tendency (M,
SD).
Content analysis of the comments was conducted using open coding (Strauss & Corbin,
1990) within a matrix of major and subcategories (Miles et al., 2014). Content analysis can be
referred to as “a research method for subjective interpretation of the content of text data through
the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005, p. 1278). It is “a method for systematically describing the meaning of
qualitative material” (Schreier, 2012, p. 1). Open coding entails the initial breakdown of raw
text into conceptual categories. These categories are discrete and detail a particular
phenomenon, which, in this study, are the responses to each survey question. Themes emerge by
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systematically linking categories to quantitative findings through the process of triangulation.
The intent of analysis is to find a common core of consensual meanings across categories yet
retain the personal experience. For an analysis to be credible, it must be plausible and cohesive
and correspondence with the data must be demonstrable (Denzin, 1989; Riessman, 1993).
For the first Likert scale question—To what extent do you agree or disagree that your
institution has a formal campus threat assessment policy?—the quantitative analysis shows the
mean is 3.43 (SD = 1.6), which, when rounded, is categorized as neutral. Frequency distribution
shows that two thirds of the sample (13 of 21, or 62%) responded agree or strongly agree. One
third (7 of 21, or 33%) responded disagree or strongly disagree (see Table 2). The results of this
question indicate that the majority of respondents have some form of threat assessment policy or
protocol in effect.

Table 2
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 1: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree That
Your Institution Has a Formal Campus Threat Assessment Policy?

Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

4

19.0

19.0

19.0

Disagree

3

14.3

14.3

33.3

Neutral

1

4.8

4.8

38.1

Agree

6

28.6

28.6

66.7

Strongly agree

7

33.3

33.3

100.0

21

100.0

100.0

Total
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Qualitative analysis from the follow-up to Question 1—What was the primary reason for
its implementation?—indicates that a third of respondents (n = 7, with no response from 2
participants) did not have a formal policy, as shown in these responses:
We do not have a formal policy, but we do have a behavioral intervention team that
utilizes a threat assessment tool.
No policy. We are a very small CC campus, but strongly supported and patrolled by
local law enforcement. At this time we do not find it necessary to have a formal policy
other than our emergency response policy that covers bomb threats, fire, tornado, etc.
We do not have a formal policy, but I do an informal threat assessment tool that I use
when warranted.
For those participants who suggested a policy is in place, the reason given most often
involved campus safety, especially with the recent threats and shootings on U.S. campuses.
Representative comments include the following:
We understand that threats are a fact of life so there is a multi-pronged approach in
dealing with them and hopefully preventing them. We have a behavioral intervention
team, employee training and awareness to threat response, and law enforcement on
campus.
Concerns over shootings at Columbine and other such threats, especially after VA Tech.
Prevention and management of potential acts of violence on our campus.
A subsidiary theme is suggested by the last statement above: Strategy of Preparedness
and Response to Campus Emergencies:
The primary reason for implementation of a threat assessment policy is to provide clear
expectations that threats will not be tolerated and to clearly articulate what the
consequences of issuing a threat will be.
To ensure that the prevention of violent acts against the college community would be
addressed as part of the college’s overall emergency preparedness strategy.
Previously there was an institutional failure to document and appropriately deal with
concerning behavior.
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We have been working on improvements to our campus safety and security procedures.
In 2014, we began a more active collaboration with area law enforcement agencies. We
still have much work to do but we are on the right track.
Table 3 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
Table 3
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 1: What Was the Primary Reason for Its
Implementation?
Recurring
Theme

A

No policy

X

B

D

E

F

G

X

Campus Safety

X

Prevention
Recent
Violence

C

H

I

X

X

J

K

M

X

O

P

Q

R

X
X

X

X

S

T

X
X

X

X

N

X

X
X

L

X
X

X

X

X

The quantitative analysis of the second Likert scale question—To what extent do you
agree or disagree that when your institution defined the problem of campus violence, this
definition included threats of violence?—indicates the mean is 3.43 (SD = 1.4), which, when
rounded up, is placed in the agree group and when rounded down is considered neutral. This
indicates very weak agreement (i.e., 1 person makes a difference, which is considered very
unreliable, especially in a small sample). Frequency distribution shows that two thirds of the
sample (13 of 21, or 62%) agree or strongly agree. A little over a fourth (6 of 21, or 29%)
disagree or strongly disagree (see Table 4). The results of this question indicate that the
respondents have a strong understanding of the problem of campus violence through clear
definitions of the campus and threats of violence.
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Table 4
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 2: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree That
When Your Institution Defined the Problem of Campus Violence, This Definition Included
Threats of Violence?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

3

14.3

14.3

14.3

Disagree

3

14.3

14.3

28.6

Neutral

2

9.5

9.5

38.1

Agree

8

38.1

38.1

76.2

Strongly agree

5

23.8

23.8

100.0

21

100.0

100.0

Total

Qualitative analysis from the follow-up to Question 2—What is your college’s definition
of campus violence?—indicates that 9 participants did not respond and 4 disclosed that a
definition was not part of policy:
Not clearly defined in the campus policy.
Though not directly stated, campus violence would be defined as any act that includes
verbal or physical assault, a threat of assault, or any threatening or disruptive behavior on
campus.
Unknown, but I’m sure we informally have defined. It would seem to be any action that
results in harm to others physically (campus shootings).
Definitions offered varied, even those informally or indirectly stated, as two of the above. Some
mentioned threats, harm, and violence against anyone on campus:
It included threats of violence, but specifically we define it as intentionally or recklessly
causing physical harm or endangering the health or safety of any person.
A basic definition would include any act which results, or threatens to result in harm to a
person or damage to property.
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Physical force, threatening physical force, intimidation used against any person engaged
in an activity properly undertaken as part of an institutional relationship of the college
except as permitted under normal law enforcement procedures.
Any incidents that put anyone on campus at risk.
Violent acts include physical assault, threat of assault (either written, verbal, or
otherwise), and/or threatening behavior (physical or verbal) occurring in the campus or
workplace setting.
We use the World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition that states “the intentional
use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or
against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in
injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development, or deprivation.”
Two others extended the definition by using language from their student code of conduct:
Per our student code of conduct language—violence of any kind will not be tolerated on
college premises or at college sponsored events. A series of the various code violations
are located in the code of conduct.
From our student handbook it says “no student will engage in physical abuse, verbal
abuse, threats, intimidation, harassment, coercion and/or conduct that threatens or
endangers the health and safety of any person.”
Another extended the definition to anger, illegal activities, and patterns of inappropriate
behavior:
Any act of violence or threat of violence. Also look at behaviors that interfere w/
classroom or campus activities, patterns of inappropriate behavior, anger management
concerns, direct and indirect threats, and illegal activities.
Table 5 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
The quantitative analysis of the third Likert scale question—To what extent do you agree
or disagree, that in the policy-making process your institution assembled evidence and/or
collected data of the problem of campus violence?—shows the mean is 2.95 (SD = 1.2), which,
when rounded, places it in the neutral category. Frequency distribution shows that the responses
are almost evenly distributed across neutral (8 of 21, or 38%), agree or strongly agree (7 of 21,
or 33%), and disagree or strongly disagree (6 of 21, or 29%) (see Table 6). The responses to this
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question were less clear as only one third indicated they collected data regarding the problem of
campus violence. Based on the strong response to the neutral and disagreement categories, it
appears this has not been a factor in the policy development process.

Table 5
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 2: What Is Your College’s Definition of Campus
Violence?
Recurring
Theme

A

No Definition

X

Violence of
Any Kind

B

C

D

E

F

G

X
X

X

Threats

H

I

X

X

J

K

X

X

M

N

X

X

X

L

X

O

P

Q

R

X
X

S

T

X
X

X

U
X

X

X

X

Table 6
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 3: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That in
the Policy-Making Process Your Institution Assembled Evidence and/or Collected Data of the
Problem of Campus Violence?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

4

19.0

19.0

19.0

Disagree

2

9.5

9.5

28.6

Neutral

8

38.1

38.1

66.7

Agree

5

23.8

23.8

90.5

Strongly agree

2

9.5

9.5

100.0

21

100.0

100.0

Total
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Qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 3—What was the evidence and/or data
collected?—indicates that the number and type of responses suggest that data to inform policy is
limited at the sample schools: 8 did not respond and 1 said “No policy has been written, therefore
no data or evidence collected.” Many mentioned internal and external evidence used. Clery Act
data were especially noted, either in use or under consideration to use:
We have staff members who have attended the Clery Compliance & Title IX seminars.
They are reviewing and incorporating data into our policy development.
This is a relatively new process using Maxient software to track a variety of behavioral
issues, including violence. There is not sufficient data to analyze at this time.
Clery stats, media outlets. No campus has been survey conducted.
We used Clery data and data provided by the organization called NHERM or the National
Center for Higher Education Risk Management.
Only getting started. The Umpqua tragedy will be looked closely and will look at Clery
data eventually.
Annual crime data.
Secondary data collected, such as statistics and trends from staff training, webinars, and
articles.
Data was mainly driven by media coverage of incidents around the U.S. The statistics
that the Dept. of Justice came out with involving sexual violence on campus. Finally,
local data of crimes in the area that could spill over on the campus—domestic violence,
etc.
We used local, state, and federal crime reporting data.
Table 7 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
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Table 7
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 3: What Was the Evidence and/or Data
Collected?
Recurring
Theme

A

No Evidence

X

B

C

D

E

F

X

Clery Data
Crime Data

G

H

I

J

X

X

X

K

L

X
X

Recent
Violence

X
X

M

N

X

X

O

P

Q

X

X

X

R

S

T

X
X

U
X

X

X
X

X

For the fourth Likert scale question—To what extent do you agree or disagree, that when
constructing policy alternatives your institution weighed the risks and benefits of each potential
alternative?—the quantitative analysis shows the mean is 2.90 (SD = 1.2), which, when rounded,
is categorized as neutral.
Frequency distribution shows an almost equal number responded disagree or strongly
disagree (8 of 21, or 38%) as did those who responded agree or strongly agree (7 of 21, or 33%).
One fourth were neutral (6 of 21, or 29%) (see Table 8). Although fairly evenly distributed, the
results confirm that most respondents did not use this aspect of Bardach’s model in their policy
development process.
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Table 8
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 4: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That
When Constructing Policy Alternatives Your Institution Weighed the Risks and Benefits of
Each Potential Alternative?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

3

14.3

14.3

14.3

Disagree

5

23.8

23.8

38.1

Neutral

6

28.6

28.6

66.7

Agree

5

23.8

23.8

90.5

Strongly agree

2

9.5

9.5

100.0

21

100.0

100.0

Total

The qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 4—What were some of the risks
and benefits of each potential alternative?—indicates 9 did not respond and 3 did not engage in a
consideration of risks/benefits and/or were not aware of policy alternatives. Of those who did
comment, only one mentioned a model:
Went with one alternative—Virginia Tech model.
Local responses considered to mediate campus violence were:
Defining threats and other key concepts that would hold up in a court of law. Combing
our behavioral intervention team with our student threat assessment team and our student
cares committee.
As far as campus violence is concerned there were not many alternatives because the
constant goal was the safety and security of the college. One alternative addressed years
ago was to hire armed police or unarmed security. The benefit of armed police
outweighed that of security.
We have spent considerable time working on how and when to assemble our emergency
response team. This included the consideration of many alternatives. The team also
spent a morning on scenario training/discussion with a law enforcement trainer.

56
Concealed carry v. open carry for example. Concealed carry could lead to individuals
who are not properly trained endangering others. It could also create additional threats in
case of an active shooter on campus. Only our trained security are allowed to carry on
campus.
Table 9 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
Table 9
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 4: What Were Some of the Risks and Benefits of
Each Potential Alternative?
Recurring
Theme

A

B

C

No Evaluation

X

X

X

D

Communication

F

G

X

Campus Safety
Liability

E

X
X

H

I

X

X

J

K

X

L

M N

O

P

Q

R

S

T

U

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

For the quantitative analysis of the fifth Likert scale question—To what extent do you
agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your institution included a method to be
used to determine the outcomes (measure of success) of the policy option chosen?—the mean is
2.24 (SD = .995), which, when rounded, is in the disagree group. Frequency distribution shows
that almost two thirds disagree/strongly disagree (13 of 21, or 62%) and only 1 agreed (5%) with
the question. Almost one third were neutral (7 of 21, or 33%) (see Table 10). These responses
confirm that it is difficult to quantify success with regard to having a threat assessment policy in
place. The qualitative responses confirm this as well, with a clear theme that not having an act of
violence occur indicates perhaps that the policy has worked, but it cannot necessarily be
quantified.
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Table 10
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 5: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That in
the Policy-Making Process Your Institution Included a Method to Be Used to Determine the
Outcomes (Measure of Success) of the Policy Option Chosen?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

5

23.8

23.8

23.8

Disagree

8

38.1

38.1

61.9

Neutral

7

33.3

33.3

95.2

Agree

0

0

0

0

Strongly agree

1

4.8

4.8

21

100.0

100.0

Total

100.0

Qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 5—What were those methods and did
they show any success?—indicates that 11 respondents had no response. One mentioned a
process:
We are still in the “measure of success” continuum. That is to say we annually review
our process and usually make changes to that process. Examples: consistency of
application, training for members, and Title IX implications.
Most reported no methods or no awareness of methods:
No methods identified for measuring outcomes. We do review cases to record the
outcome, i.e., was a viable threat made, what was level of threat, what was the
intervention.
Not aware of any outcome measures.
We do not measure if the outcome was successful other than no further issues occur.
No method integrated into the process. More common sense—act of violence diverted by
use of assessment tool—then success.
No method used to determine this.
Table 11 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
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Table 11
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 5: What Were Those Methods and Did They Show
Any Success?
Recurring
Theme

A

B

C

No Method

X

X

X

Post-Case
Review
Common Sense

D

E

F

X
X

G

H

I

J

X

X

X

X

K

L

M N

O

P

Q

X

X

X

X

X

R

S

T

X

U
X

X

X

X

X

X

The quantitative analysis of the sixth Likert scale question—To what extent do you agree
or disagree, that in the policy-making process your final policy decision to address campus
violence had an impact or satisfied the needs of all stakeholders?—resulted in a mean of 2.90
(SD = 1.4), which, when rounded, placed it in the neutral group. Frequency distribution shows
an equal number responded disagree/strongly disagree (8 of 21, or 38%) as did agree/strongly
agree, and one third (8 of 21, or 38%) responded strongly disagree/disagree. About a fourth
were neutral (5 of 21, or 24%) (see Table 12). There was an equal mix of agreement and
disagreement, which means, as the research indicates, that the process needs to be more
inclusive. Many of qualitative responses confirmed this as well.
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Table 12
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 6: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That in
the Policy-Making Process Your Final Policy Decision to Address Campus Violence Had an
Impact or Satisfied the Needs of All Stakeholders?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

5

23.8

23.8

23.8

Disagree

3

14.3

14.3

38.1

Neutral

5

23.8

23.8

61.9

Agree

5

23.8

23.8

85.7

Strongly agree

3

14.3

14.3

100.0

21

100.0

100.0

Total

The qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 6—How did the final decision
satisfy the needs of stakeholders?—indicates that 9 participants did not respond. Several
dismissed the question, saying that not everyone can be satisfied, or indirect evidence suggested
to the respondent that stakeholders were satisfied:
Stakeholders were satisfied.
I doubt that you ever satisfy the needs of all stakeholders. There are reasonable
accommodations to meet the interests of faculty and law enforcement. The position of
open carry and concealed carry advocates is not represented on the policy.
It’s believed to have satisfied stakeholders because the program has name recognition.
People make referrals and use the system.
The only contributing comments I would have would be that we saw an increase in
reporting of threating behavior so there was apparently an impact but it’s not really
quantifiable.
It was interesting whom the respondents identified as stakeholders. The board and
executive leadership were cited by some as stakeholders:
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Board approved. Reporting requirements and access to campus violence data is
satisfactory to students, faculty, and staff.
President and Cabinet approved. No Board approval necessary. Satisfied as much as it
can be for now. Let’s hope the tool never fails us.
Others included staff, faculty, and students in the stakeholder group:
It was approved by our Student Cares Committee, Cabinet, and President.
Supported in writing by the President, Cabinet, and Board of Trustees. We also did a
public relations campaign that included web pages, flyers, email sent to all staff, faculty,
students, with no negative feedback in return.
We conducted a survey to all staff and faculty and all were satisfied. However, one
theme emerged indicating more student involvement needed.
Others admitted that stakeholders were not satisfied, were unaware of, or were not part of the
process:
Not all stakeholders satisfied, but I believe that many people on campus see and
appreciate that we are taking campus safety seriously.
Some key stakeholders were not part of the process.
I think many stakeholders are unaware that there is a group of folks on campus that work
on these issues.
Three cited strategies—survey, formal presentation, and formation of an intervention
team—were thought to have positively engaged stakeholders:
We conducted a survey to all staff and faculty and all were satisfied. However, one
theme emerged indicating more student involvement needed.
Formal presentation open to the public with media coverage and question & answer time
allowed.
Most recent decision was to enact the behavioral intervention team in order to help
students, assist instructors with behaviors in the classroom and to hopefully defuse a
violent incident before it happened. It seems to have had a positive effect on all the
stakeholders involved.
Table 13 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
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Table 13
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 6: How Did the Final Decision Satisfy the Needs
of Stakeholders?
Recurring
Theme

A

No Impact

X

Satisfied
w/Policy

B

C

D

E

F

G

X
X

X

X

Dissatisfied
w/Policy

H

I

X

X

J

K

M N

O

P

Q

R

X

X

X

X

L

X

X

X

S

T

X
X

X

U
X

X

X

X

The quantitative analysis of the seventh Likert scale question—To what extent do you
agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your institution confronted the trade-offs or
deviations in the projected outcomes to address acts of campus violence?—indicates the mean is
2.48 (SD = .981), which, when rounded, places it in the neutral category. Frequency distribution
shows that almost half disagree/strongly disagree (10 of 21, or 48%) and 3 agreed (14%) with the
question. One third was neutral (8 of 21, or 38%) (see Table 14). The responses affirm that the
majority of respondents did not consider how to address deviations in the policy when the
outcome was different than anticipated. For instance, if the assessment fails to stop an act of
violence, how does an institution address it? This aspect should be thought out and planned for
in the policy development stage.
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Table 14
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 7: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That in
the Policy-Making Process Your Institution Confronted the Trade-Offs or Deviations in the
Projected Outcomes to Address Acts of Campus Violence?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

4

19.0

19.0

19.0

Disagree

6

28.6

28.6

47.6

Neutral

8

38.1

38.1

85.7

Agree

3

14.3

14.3

100.0

Strongly agree

0

0

0

0

21

100.0

100.0

Total

Qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 7—What were the trade-offs and/or
deviations from the projected outcomes?—indicates the majority did not respond or said the issue
was not considered. The few who offered comments included:
Trade-offs for enacting a behavioral intervention team were that faculty may think we are
taking over the classroom management, thus not willing to fill out a referral form, in a
potential act of violence.
Some felt the database should be open to all. Some believed everyone should know
about everyone who made a threat to anyone.
Main deviation identified was people (faculty mostly) being unwilling to report
suspicious behavior of students. We addressed this by letting them know that each case
would be kept as confidential as possible and that the main purpose of reporting was
saving lives potentially.
Liability is the issue here. You can never be totally free from liability. No matter how
many policies and legal backing you have.
Table 15 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
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Table 15
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 7: What Were the Trade-Offs and/or Deviations
From the Projected Outcomes?
Recurring
Theme

A

B

C

D

E

Not Evaluated

X

X

X

X

X

Policy Buy-In

F

X

G

H

I

J

X

X

X

X

K

X

L

M N

O

P

Q

R

S

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

T

U
X

X

Liability

X

The quantitative analysis of the eighth Likert scale question—To what extent do you
agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your institution conducted internal checks
to determine how the policy-decision makers were doing in the development of a policy to
address campus violence?—indicates the mean is 2.81 (SD = 1.1), which, when rounded is
categorized as neutral. Frequency distribution shows an even three-way split across responses:
disagree/strongly disagree (7 of 21, or 33%), agree/strongly agree (7 of 21, or 33% each), and
neutral (7 of 21, or 33%) (see Table 16). Although these response groups are equal, if the
neutral responses are combined with the disagree/strongly disagree responses, it is clear that
there is a need for administrative accountability in the process to ensure objectives are being met
based on a clear timeline.
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Table 16
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 8: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That in
the Policy-Making Process Your Institution Conducted Internal Checks to Determine How the
Policy-Decision Makers Were Doing in the Development of
a Policy to Address Campus Violence?

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Strongly disagree

4

19.0

19.0

19.0

Disagree

3

14.3

14.3

33.3

Neutral

7

33.3

33.3

66.7

Agree

7

33.3

33.3

100.0

Strongly agree

0

0

0

0

21

100.0

100.0

Total

The qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 8—What type of checks are there
and how often were they conducted?—indicates the majority did not respond or said checks were
not made. A few mentioned campus committees that included the board, a senior level
administrator, or faculty, some of which meet regularly and others only occasionally. Responses
included:
We have a core team that internally discusses every threat and determines if checks and
balances are being met. We discuss each issue and use it as a learning experience and as
a development opportunity.
The Associate Dean was assigned this and completed the task through many meetings
with the Cabinet and Board of Trustees.
Chair of committee was VP and she definitely kept the ball rolling.
We have met consistently as a group. In addition, various departments have completed
specific assignments.
The oversight committee meets annually to review. The review consists of this question:
what has changed and what is working/not working?
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We have a three council model: faculty, administrative, and staff. Each council was
provided the opportunity to provide input after presentations. After this it went to the
Board of approval.
We have a behavioral intervention team (BIT) that meets twice a month to review
situations. When we started the process of having a BIT we had a large group of folks
from different divisions within the college participate in the development.
Table 17 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
Table 17
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 8: What Type of Checks Are There and How
Often Were They Conducted?
Recurring
Theme

A

B

No
Accountability

X

X

Committee Used

C

D

E

F

G

X

X

Monthly
Meetings

X

X

X

H

I

J

X

X

X

K

X

L

X

M N

O

P

Q

X

X

X

R

S

T

X

U

X

X
X

X

X

The quantitative analysis of the ninth Likert scale question—To what extent do you agree
or disagree, that in the policy-making process your institution told the story or presented the
policy decision to all stakeholders?—indicates the mean is 2.76 (SD = 1.3), which, when
rounded, is placed in the neutral group. Frequency distribution shows that almost half
disagree/strongly disagree (10 of 21, or 48%) and a little over a fourth agree/strongly agree (6 of
21, or 29%). Nearly a fourth was neutral (5 of 21, or 24%) (see Table 18). Based on the
responses to this question, it is clear that the majority of respondents were not required, nor was
it deemed necessary, to build support or consensus for the implementation of their respective
threat assessment policies.

66
Table 18
Data Analysis Results for Survey Question 9: To What Extent Do You Agree or Disagree, That in
the Policy-Making Process Your Institution Told the Story or Presented the Policy Decision to
All Stakeholders?

Valid

Valid
Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Frequency

Percent

Strongly disagree

4

19.0

19.0

19.0

Disagree

6

28.6

28.6

47.6

Neutral

5

23.8

23.8

71.4

Agree

3

14.3

14.3

85.7

Strongly agree

3

14.3

14.3

100.0

21

100.0

100.0

Total

Qualitative analysis for the follow-up to Question 9—How was this message
delivered?—revealed that 13 participants did not respond. The most often mentioned mechanism
was that it was informally delivered to general stakeholders through orientation sessions, email
reports, and other university portals:
In reference to the behavioral intervention team as well as other topics, it is relayed in
new employee orientations, student orientations, security reports sent by email and on
website.
A marketing plan was developed to ensure all stakeholders know of the program. We
used meetings, the internet, and our web site to educate others. A pamphlet was
developed. It was discussed at Board of Trustees meetings.
Email to all staff, faculty, and students.
Our campus is made aware of our code of conduct through face-to-face department level
meetings, a campus-wide portal, and as part of training for all new employees. Students
are made aware in the new student orientation, the portal and the college catalog.
Just policy manuals updated. Student Conduct and Public Safety web pages have link to
policy.
Formal presentation to executive leadership was mentioned by a few:
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We delivered to Board, Executive Council, and employees, but we never formally shared
with students. It’s just expected they review the policies. We recognize this as an
opportunity for improvement.
The process of making policy includes a college senate that is representative of internal
stakeholders, the College President, and the College Board of Trustees. The only avenue
for external stakeholders is at the Board of Trustees meetings and this appears to be
underutilized.
Formal presentation to President and Cabinet.
Presented very much so! There were formal presentations to the President, Cabinet, and
Board. Also did a marketing campaign to educate using the web, email, flyers, and social
media.
Table 19 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.

Table 19
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 9: How Was This Message Delivered?
Recurring
Theme

A

B

Story Not Told

X

X

C

D

F

G

X

Broadly Told
Lack of
Inclusivity

E

X
X

H

I

X

X

J

K

L

M N

X
X

X

O

P

X
X

X

Q

R

X
X

S

T

U

X

X

X

X

X

For the qualitative analysis for the final open-ended question, Question 10—Is there
anything else you would like to add to the responses you have provided?—several said they did
not have a policy, so they found the survey difficult to complete:
Not sure our campus has completed a process you described in the memo. However, we
deal with campus threats/violence issues on a regular basis and have a team approach to
deal with the issues. I look forward to the results of your study to help improve our
college.
It was difficult to answer as the assumption was a formal policy and data review process
in establishing things.
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Only one respondent felt his or her institution had a policy and could respond effectively to the
survey:
In our most recent policy revision process related to threat assessment, we made a
conscious decision to expand beyond “active shooter” scenarios to focus on three types of
risk: disruption, harm to self, harm to others. Also chose to focus on early detection.
One summed up his or her reaction to the study by stating:
Your study will be the extra evidence we need to get things going formally.
Table 20 indicates the major themes derived from all respondents.
Table 20
Recurring Themes from Open-Ended Question 10: Is There Anything Else You Would Like to
Add to the Responses You Have Provided?
Recurring
Theme

A

Nothing to Add

B

C

X

X

D

F

G

X

X

H

X

Difficult to
Complete
Study Useful

E

X

I

J

K

L

M N

O

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

P

X

X

Q

R

S

T

U

X

X

X

X

X

X

Research Question Integration
Once the overall research results were documented, the next step was to integrate the
research outcomes with the research questions. The first research question is: How have
Michigan community colleges implemented campus threat assessment protocols according to
Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis? The data from Question 1 of the survey
show that 60% of the respondents indicated they have a campus threat assessment policy. The
responses indicated that prevention and management of potential acts of violence were central to
policy implementation.
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The second research question was: How have Michigan community colleges evaluated
the outcomes of campus threat assessment policies? Question 5 of the survey focuses on this
question. Only three respondents, or 10%, indicated they had evaluated the outcomes of campus
threat assessments, whereas 60% indicated they did not have an evaluation process, and 30%
remained neutral. The central perspective was if no acts of violence occur, then the policy has
worked.
The third research question was: What adjustments and improvements have been made by
applying Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis? Question 8 in the survey
indicates 33% made adjustments or improvements during and after the process. However, 33%
did not do this, and 33% remained neutral. The central perspective for the affirmative
respondents indicated there is a core team or committee that meets routinely to evaluate and
revise the policy as needed. The affirmative responses reflected a collegial and open discussion
of the issues and suggestions for change.
This chapter reported the outcomes of this study, specifically addressing the quantitative
and qualitative responses to the questionnaire distributed in the fall of 2015 to 60 student conduct
administrators at 27 Michigan community colleges. The fifth and final chapter will include the
researcher’s discussion of the outcomes, contributions to the literature, limitations of the
research, and recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
This research endeavor has proven to be both rewarding and challenging: rewarding in
that the research conducted with Michigan community colleges regarding campus threat
assessment policies has filled a void that the literature has not addressed. It is also challenging in
that the data collected were limited, with only 21 of 60 potential participants responding. The
data collected are valuable and valid; however, greater response on the part of the potential
participants would have provided even greater value and validity. The policy framework used
for this research was the basis for the research instrument and proved to be challenging for the
respondents. The framework assumes an organization has a formal process in place to make
policy decisions. The research outcomes proved otherwise and, again, demonstrate a lack of
engagement. Table 21 illustrates how Michigan community colleges have progressed toward
implementing threat assessment policy using Bardach’s model.
To restate the framework, Bardach’s Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis (2016) includes
the following components: (1) defining the problem, (2) assembling evidence, (3) constructing
alternatives, (4) selecting criteria, (5) projecting outcomes, (6) confronting trade-offs, (7)
deciding, and, finally, (8) telling the story. Each path was addressed in the questionnaire sent to
60 Michigan community college student conduct administrators. In addition, three research
questions further developed the level of threat assessment policy implementation at Michigan
community colleges. Those questions were:
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Table 21
Michigan Community College Campus Threat Assessment Policy Implementation Progress Utilizing Bardach’s (2016) Model
College

Problem

Evidence

Alternatives

Criteria

Outcomes

Trade-Offs

Decide

Story

A

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

B

Completed

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

C

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

D

Completed

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

E

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

F

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

G

Completed

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

H

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

I

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

J

Completed

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

K

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

Completed

L

Completed

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Completed

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

M

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

N

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

O

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete
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Table 21—Continued
College

Problem

Evidence

Alternatives

Criteria

Outcomes

Trade-Offs

Decide

Story

P

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Q

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

R

Completed

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Completed

Completed

S

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

T

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

U

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Completed

Incomplete

Incomplete

Incomplete

Completed

13

9

8

2

8

3

8

6

Incomplete

8

12

13

19

13

18

13

15
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1. How have Michigan community colleges implemented campus threat assessment
protocols according to Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis?
2. How have Michigan community colleges evaluated the outcomes of campus threat
assessment policies?
3. What adjustments and improvements are suggested by applying Bardach’s (2016)
Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis to the findings?
The research addressed Bardach’s model by providing several supporting perspectives.
The first question on the survey was asked to determine if the participants currently had a
threat assessment protocol. The majority or 60% affirmed they had some sort of assessment
policy or protocol in place. Even the second question—how their respective colleges defined the
problem of campus violence—was strong, again, with the majority responding with a clear
definition. Beyond the first two questions, however, the responses were scattered with a neutral
response being given in most instances. Noteworthy responses were provided to each question,
however, and will be discussed next. The results support the contentions in the literature review
that institutions of higher education, including community colleges in Michigan, do in fact have
some level of threat assessment in place (Deisinger et al., 2008; Hope, 2016; Randazzo &
Plummer, 2009; Schafer et al., 2016).
In defining the problem, it was clear the Michigan community colleges that responded
have completed this task. As the survey shows, 60% defined the problem of campus violence,
27% did not, and 13% remained neutral. The central perspective indicated that physical force,
threatening physical force, and intimidation used against any person engaged in an activity
properly undertaken as part of an institutional relationship of the college, except as permitted
under normal law enforcement procedures, are considered to be threats. The research outcomes
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showed that most community colleges have defined campus violence with a wide range and have
made these definitions available to all stakeholders through various methods, such as student and
faculty handbooks. Even though the individual community college’s word choice differed, the
general definition of campus violence was consistent. The results support the contentions in the
literature review that community colleges in Michigan have defined the problem of campus
violence when initiating threat policy (Bennett, 2015; Fleenor, 2009; Jeanne Clery Disclosure,
1990; Sutton, 2016).
As to assembling the evidence, the central perspective was that local, state, and federal
crime reporting, specifically Clery Act data, was crucial in this step. As the survey shows, the
responses were essentially equal: 33% indicated they collected evidence or data regarding the
problem of campus violence, whereas 29% indicated they did not, and 38% remained neutral.
The central perspective for those with affirmative responses indicated the use of Clery and other
federal statistics in the collection of evidence. Based on the survey responses, the use of Clery
data was the primary method of evidence collected to support launching policy efforts to address
potential acts of violence through threat assessment. As Johnson (2016) stated, several
community colleges in Virginia have implemented a threat policy platform to “help manage and
coordinate threat assessment team efforts, saving time and resources while improving
collaboration and information sharing” (p. 36). The results support the contentions in the
literature review that community colleges have attempted to assemble appropriate levels of
evidence when developing threat assessment policy (Jeanne Clery Disclosure, 1990; Patton &
Gregory, 2014; U.S. Secret Service & U.S. Department of Education, 2002).
As to constructing alternatives, the survey responses showed there were few alternatives
available to the participants. As the survey shows, the responses indicated 40% were in
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agreement—that they weighed the risks and benefits of potential policy alternatives, whereas
37% were in disagreement that this occurred, and 23% remained neutral. The central perspective
in this process was what is best for enhancing campus safety. Although the literature suggests
other alternatives, such as behavior profiling and computer programs that identify students at
risk, are options, stakeholders such as administrators, students, parents, community members,
and even the U.S. Department of Education have not supported such measures as they have the
potential to “infringe on students’ civil liberties and to unfairly label or stigmatize certain
students as dangerous” (Reddy et al., 2001, p. 158). These alternatives are also “inductive in
practice as they rely on aggregate information about prior events to guide inferences about facts
in a specific case” (Reddy et al., 2001, p. 167). Therefore, the Virginia Tech Model of Campus
Threat Assessment (which addresses all potential acts of violence—shootings, physical assaults,
sexual violence, etc.) appeared to many as the only objective alternative available in the
development stage of the policy process. This model is used because it is so widely marketed
and available. The model is comprehensive and easy to follow and allows community colleges
to use it in a manner that fits their respective institutional culture. Further support from the
literature regarding limited alternatives for objective threat assessment is considered by earlier
research (Deisinger et al., 2008; Randozzo & Plummer, 2009).
As to selecting criteria or determining what methods will be used to determine the
outcomes of the policy alternative(s), a notable comment from one respondent indicated that they
are still in the “measure of success continuum, that is to say, we annually review our process and
usually make changes to that process. For example, a review is made in regard to consistency of
application, training for members, and Title IX implications.” The overarching theme was that if
no act of violence occurs, the policy is successful. This aspect of Bardach’s model was difficult
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to assess for the research participants. As the survey shows, the majority of respondents, or 60%,
indicated they did not have a method to measure the success of the policy, whereas 30%
remained neutral, and only 3 participants, or 10%, agreed there was a method to measure
success. What is difficult is knowing whether the absence of violence is because of
implementation of the threat assessment policy. It is very difficult to measure the success of
having a threat assessment in place. None of the contentions indicated in the literature supported
this aspect of Bardach’s model.
As to project outcomes of the alternative(s) or the impact the policy will have for all
stakeholders, the central perspective was most stakeholders were satisfied, primarily board and
executive leadership; however, in many cases, stakeholders such as student organizations were
left out of the process, and therefore their satisfaction level is unknown. As the survey shows,
43% agreed their process satisfied the needs of stakeholders, whereas 34% disagreed this
occurred, and 23% remained neutral. Based on the responses to the research instrument, it was
apparent the institutions must be as inclusive as possible in the creation, implementation, and
revision of threat assessment policies. Most schools had the involvement of only executive-level
leadership in the process, whereas schools who indicated more stakeholders being involved
improved transparency, which in turn heightened the level of satisfaction of the policy. It is clear
that threat assessment teams could be more inclusive, which would increase satisfaction with the
process and outcome. The outcomes of this aspect of Bardach’s model are supported in the
literature review as well, that diverse and inclusive stakeholder involvement is essential to policy
success (Maher, 2014; Mastrodicasa, 2008; Scalora et al., 2010; Virginia Tech Review Panel,
2007).
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As to confronting trade-offs of each policy alternative and addressing deviations in the
outcomes, the primary perspective or, in this case, deviation identified was people (mostly
faculty) being unwilling to report suspicious behavior of students. This was addressed, however,
by letting personnel know that each case would be kept as confidential as possible and that the
main purpose of reporting was to potentially save lives. As the survey shows, only 6, or 20%,
agreed that confronting deviations might occur from the policy implemented, whereas 47%
indicated they had not done this, and 33% remained neutral. One comment involved the fear of
faculty losing the ability to have control over their classrooms.
Based on the research outcomes, most participants, in fact, felt that having a threat
assessment policy in place was better than not having a policy in place. The secondary concerns
require ongoing education for the constituents of community colleges to understand and build
open communication or community in an effort to keep their campus safe from acts of violence.
None of the contentions in the literature review supported this aspect of Bardach’s model.
As to making the policy decision and what internal checks are needed among the
personnel tasked with the policy decision, the central perspective is that a third of all respondents
have some level of oversight committee structure to keep the policy process moving forward. As
the survey shows, the distribution was a three-way split, with 33% in agreement that they had a
process to evaluate outcomes of their policy, 33% in disagreement, and 33% remaining neutral.
The central perspective for the affirmative respondents indicated there is a core team or
committee that meets routinely to evaluate and revise the policy as needed. The affirmative
responses reflected a collegial and open discussion of the issues and suggestions for change. It is
important for institutions to have at least an annual review of all policies. However, this research
endeavor did not seek to determine how often this process occurred. It would be beneficial for
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further research to ascertain this information. The contentions in the literature support this aspect
of Bardach’s model of the importance of strong organizational structure to keep the process
moving (Ciulla, 2004; Hope, 2016).
With telling the story, the central perspective indicated that community college campuses
are made aware of the code of conduct through face-to-face department-level meetings, a
campus-wide portal, and as part of training for all new employees. Students are made aware in
the new student orientation, the portal, and the college catalog. Many also indicated that the
process of making policy includes a college senate that is representative of internal stakeholders,
the college president, and the college board of trustees. The only avenue for external
stakeholders is at the board of trustee meetings, and this appears to be underutilized. Again,
opening up all channels of communication when developing a threat assessment policy only adds
to support it. As the survey shows, 33% indicated this had occurred; however, 40% indicated
this had not occurred, and 27% remained neutral. It was clear from the research outcomes that
community colleges are in fact including all in the process of communication with regard to
campus threat assessment policy and protocol, but that student involvement could be improved.
These perspectives are further supported by the contentions of the literature review (Hope, 2016;
Schafer et al., 2016).
The research addressed the three specific research questions in the following manner.
Regarding how Michigan community colleges have implemented campus threat assessment
protocols by using Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis, the research showed
most Michigan community colleges have some sort of threat assessment policy in place, with
60% of the respondents indicating their institution has a campus threat assessment policy. The
responses indicated prevention and management of potential acts of violence were central to
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policy implementation. To find further validation of these data, the researcher conducted an
Internet search of Michigan community colleges with threat assessment information or policy
available on the Internet. The results of this search showed that 10 Michigan community
colleges had made this information readily available. The majority, or six, of those community
colleges specifically cited the use of a Behavior Intervention Team (BIT) as the means of
conducting threat assessment. This information was available from a Web link that provided a
direct route to the page. In addition, three of the six schools using BIT had their information
directly linked to their annual campus security report. Of the three remaining community
colleges, two of the links went directly to the respective college’s student handbook, and the
third college’s link led directly to a policy page detailing its threat assessment policy and
procedure. All of the community colleges identified in the Internet search were consistent in
their policy statements regarding campus threat assessment. The statements centered around
three themes: (1) a definition of violence and threats of violence that are prohibited, (2) reporting
procedure for violations, and (3) response to reported violations.
Regarding how Michigan community colleges have evaluated the outcomes of campus
threat assessments, the research showed three respondents, or 10%, indicated they had evaluated
the outcomes of campus threat assessments, whereas 60% indicated they did not have an
evaluation process, and 30% remained neutral. This is indicative of the difficulty in measuring
such a task. The theme from this question indicated that if no acts of violence (shootings,
physical assault, sexual violence, etc.) occur, then stakeholders assume the policy has worked.
Finally, with the question of what adjustments and improvements have been made by
applying Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis, the research showed that 30% of
the institutions made adjustments or improvements during and after the process. However, 40%
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did not do this, and 30% remained neutral. The central theme for the affirmative respondents
indicated there is a core team or committee that meets routinely to evaluate and revise the policy
as needed. The affirmative responses reflected a collegial and open discussion of the issues and
suggestions for change. Therefore, it appears this aspect of the policy development process is in
need of further development. However, many schools indicated that policy review is part of their
institutional continuous improvement process.
Contribution to the Literature
The professional literature on subject of campus violence is ever-growing; however,
research on policy initiatives other than integrating the Virginia Tech model into campus threat
assessment protocols has room to grow. In a limited manner, this researcher has addressed this
void in introducing a policy decision model that can give the process of developing and
implementing a campus threat assessment policy more clarity and direction. In addition, based
on the outcomes of the research, further contribution is provided to the literature to support that
community colleges are actively involved in making their respective campuses safe by
confirming that they do have a system in place to assess, prevent, and manage potential acts of
violence.
Limitations of Research
This study had several limitations. The first limitation involved data being collected from
27 Michigan community colleges. Because this study investigated campus threat assessment
policy implementation at a small number of colleges with a small response rate of 21 out of the
60 questionnaires sent, the findings cannot fully represent the practices of all community
colleges nationally. Because the community colleges represent only the state of Michigan, it is
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possible that policy implementation practices differ dramatically in other areas of the United
States, and the findings do not represent a comprehensive community college administrator
population. It is certainly possible that community colleges in close proximity to nationally
recognized public tragedies have a high rate of policy implementation.
A second limitation involves the perspectives of the respondents at each community
college that participated. A large portion of this study utilized qualitative research that involved
collecting data from open-ended questions that sought to address how participants’ respective
community college developed and implemented campus threat assessment policy and protocol.
There is criticism amongst some public administration researchers that qualitative research lacks
reliability and validity, which decreases the credibility of the research design (LeCompte &
Goetz, 1982). In qualitative research, “Validity and reliability are concerns that can be
approached through careful attention to a study’s conceptualization and the way in which the
data were collected, analyzed, and interpreted, and the way in which the findings are presented”
(Merriam, 1998, pp. 199-200). In addition, qualitative studies generate an abundance of data,
which can be difficult to analyze. Critics have difficulty in accepting generalizations based on a
small sample but with a large amount of information (Yin, 2014).
A third limitation in this study is timing. When this study was conducted, the perspectives
of the respondents may have been influenced by current events and campus culture during the
timeframe required for response, in this case, from November 15, 2016 to December 15, 2016.
No significant campus events occurred during this period; however, the very well-publicized
shooting at Umpqua Community College in Roseburg, Oregon, had occurred just 6 weeks
earlier, leaving nine dead, nine injured, and the shooter committing suicide. This tragedy placed
the spotlight on how educational institutions provide a safe and secure environment on their
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respective campuses. This, in turn, may have influenced some not to respond at all or not to
respond openly to the questions due to recent concerns.
A fourth limitation is that the researcher is employed as a student conduct administrator
at a Michigan community college. The researcher’s community college did not participate in the
questionnaire; however, this fact may contribute to a perceived bias toward the dissertation topic
as a whole. To address this perception, the researcher focused on the outcomes of the research
for this dissertation, previous research, and literature from peers and academia addressing the
topic of campus threat assessment, rather than on subjective generalizations provided solely by
the researcher. The inclusion of quantitative data also assisted in alleviating the perception of
bias.
Recommendations for Future Research
Based on the limited study population used for this study and also the subsequent limited
response rate of those surveyed, it seems apparent that in the future a study such as this should be
conducted at a national level. In addition, an in-person interview component should be
integrated into the data collection phase. Having one-on-one interviews may allow respondents
to speak more openly about this topic in a conversational setting. Interviews render the process
more personal, and if another student conduct administrator conducts a study such as this again,
having the respondent know that the research derives from one of their colleagues might also
assist in the richness of the information provided.
Conclusions
This dissertation has evaluated campus threat assessment policy and procedure
implementation at the community college level of higher education. The primary goal of
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implementing and following a threat assessment policy is campus safety. As Deisinger et al.
(2008) indicated,
This goal must always be kept in mind, both in the short term through assessing and
managing cases, and in the long run through outreach and training efforts. Any particular
interventions—counseling, support, confrontation, termination, arrest, hospitalization,
etc.—are tools to achieve the goals of safety. They are not ends unto themselves. (p. 32)
A mixed-methods study approach used consisted of a Likert-scale survey with supporting
open-ended questions to guide the exploration of community college campus violence.
Bardach’s (2016) Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis was the framework used for Michigan
community colleges to apply to their own unique situations. This method determined the
prevalence of threat teams and protocols at Michigan community colleges and improved the
understanding of this particular policy problem for their respective administrators.
In addition, this dissertation has explored the value of campus threat assessment tools at
the community college level of higher education. The importance of this topic is evident
concerning the need for leadership at institutions of higher learning to provide a manageable and
collaborative initiative to identify, develop, implement, and evaluate a policy to effectively
prevent acts of violence on college property and recognize its benefits. A formal threat
assessment policy also addresses the legal issues of campus safety as they have potentially longlasting and costly effects on higher education (Adolf, 2012). Therefore, through a processoriented effort, the policy deemed most appropriate is that of campus threat assessment and
management. If administered appropriately, it is a policy proven to be cost-effective for
institutions of higher education in order to provide a safe learning and work environment for all.
However, leaders at institutions
must convey clear support for the threat assessment team, so that all administrative units
of the institution will be willing to provide information and accept the team’s guidance in
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dealing with threatening situations. There must be clear policies and procedures that
establish the team’s authority and scope of action. (Cornell, 2010, p. 14)
If community colleges seek to develop such policies, they will have to adapt it to their
unique setting. The most desirable aspect of this policy initiative is that it is cost-effective, as it
uses internal resources to assess and manage potential threats of violence. All of the resources
needed to assemble an assessment team, conduct assessments, develop management plans, and
monitor those plans are already available, as they are derived from existing personnel and
resources. Such resources already possess unique institutional knowledge.
Bardach’s Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis, which is the policy framework articulated
in this research, is not universal in fit but is an excellent tool to make formal policy decisions
within an organization such as a community college. To restate the model, Bardach argued that
policymakers must define the problem and gather evidence before constructing alternatives. The
model speaks to potential difficulties in gathering information: it recommends using both
documents and individuals but acknowledges that extracting information from people is often
limited by the structural bureaucracy of what participants feel comfortable divulging. Then, with
these alternatives in mind, they must select criteria for comparison and project potential
outcomes (whether positive or negative). They must address the trade-offs and share these
before they make their recommendation.
Finally, a campus threat assessment policy serves to treat all human beings involved with
fairness and respect. It does not rely on subjective information or bias, but seeks to gather
information in a rational manner and assess all information regarding the situation and the
person(s) involved in a deductive and objective manner, with a diversified team approach.
With this said, aside from the academic importance of this research, there is a pragmatic
intent of this body of work. It is anticipated that higher education administrators will read the
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information detailed and research collected from this work and be able to apply it to their unique
situation in order to identify, develop, and implement threat assessment policy in a useful and
effective manner. Perhaps the formal use of Bardach’s model will also be implemented in all
policy-decision efforts as an objective manner in which to operate their respective institutions of
higher education to best serve all stakeholders. It is recommended that community colleges and
other institutions of higher education could also formalize or institutionalize a more transparent
and rational policy-making process with a cover sheet on all new policies and major policy
revisions requiring a checklist to document the use of Bardach’s stages.
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Emergency Planning
1. Universities should do a risk analysis (threat assessment) and then choose a level of security
appropriate for their campus, how far to go in safeguarding campuses, and from which threats,
need to be considered by each institution.
2. Virginia Tech should update and enhance its Emergency Response Plan and bring it into
compliance with federal and state guidelines.
3. Virginia Tech and other institutions of higher learning should have a threat assessment team
that includes representatives from law enforcement, human resources, student and academic
affairs, legal counsel, and mental health functions. The team should be empowered to take
actions, gathering background information, identification of additional dangerous warning signs,
establishing a threat potential risk level (1 to 10) for a case, preparing a case for hearings (for
instance, commitment hearings), and disseminating warning information.
4. Students, faculty, and staff should be trained annually about responding to various
emergencies and about the notification systems that will be used.
5. Universities and colleges must comply with the Clery Act, which requires timely public
warnings of imminent danger. “Timely” should be defined clearly in the federal law.
Campus Alerting
6. Campus emergency communications systems must have multiple means of sharing
information.
7. In an emergency, immediate messages must be sent to the campus community that provide
clear information on the nature of the emergency and actions to be taken The initial messages
should be followed by update messages as more information becomes known.
8. Campus police as well as administration officials should have the authority and capability to
send an emergency message. Schools without a police department or senior security official must
designate someone able to make a quick decision without convening a committee.
Police Role and Training
9. The head of campus police should be a member of a threat assessment team as well as the
emergency response team for the university. In some cases where there is a security department
but not a police department, the security head may be appropriate.
10. Campus police must report directly to the senior operations officer responsible for emergency
decision making. They should be part of the policy team deciding on emergency planning.
11. Campus police must train for active shooters (as did the Virginia Tech Police Department).
12. The mission statement of campus police should give primacy to their law enforcement and
crime prevention role.
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Virginia Mental Health Legislation
13. Va. Code 37.2-808 (H) and (I) and 37.2-814 (A) should be amended to extend the time
periods for temporary detention to permit more thorough mental health evaluations.
14. Va. Code 37.2-809 should be amended to authorize magistrates to issue temporary detention
orders based upon evaluations conducted by emergency physicians trained to perform emergency
psychiatric evaluations.
15. The criteria for involuntary commitment in Va. Code 37.2-817(B) should be modified in
order to promote more consistent application of the standard and to allow involuntary treatment
in a broader range of cases involving severe mental illness.
16. The number and capacity of secure crisis stabilization units should be expanded where
needed in Virginia to ensure that individuals who are subject to a temporary detention order do
not need to wait for an available bed.
17. The role and responsibilities of the independent evaluator in the commitment process should
be clarified and steps taken to assure that the necessary reports and collateral information are
assembled before the independent evaluator conducts the evaluation.
18. The following documents should be presented at the commitment hearing: The complete
evaluation of the treating physician, including collateral information; reports of any lab and
toxicology tests conducted; reports of prior psychiatric history and all admission forms and
nurse’s notes.
19. The Virginia Code should be amended to require the presence of the pre-screener or other
CSB representative at all commitment hearings and to provide adequate resources to facilitate
CSB compliance.
20. The independent evaluator, if not present in person, and treating physician should be
available where possible if needed for questioning during the hearing.
21. The Virginia Health Records Privacy statute should be amended to provide a safe harbor
provision which would protect health entities and providers from liability or loss of funding
when they disclose information in connection with evaluations and commitment hearings
conducted under Virginia Code 37.2-814 et seq.
22. Virginia Health Records Privacy and Va. Code 37.2-814 et seq. should be amended to ensure
that all entities involved with treatment have full authority to share records with each other and
all persons involved in the involuntary commitment process while providing the legal safeguards
needed to prevent unwarranted breaches of confidentiality.
23. Virginia Code 37.2-817(C) should be amended to clarify: the need for specificity in
involuntary outpatient orders; the appropriate recipients of certified copies of orders; the party
responsible for certifying copies of orders; the party responsible for reporting noncompliance
with outpatient orders and to whom noncompliance is reported; the mechanism for returning the
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noncompliant person to court; the sanction(s) to be imposed on the noncompliant person who
does not pose an imminent danger to himself or others; the respective responsibilities of the
detaining facility, the CSB, and the outpatient treatment provider in assuring effective
implementation of involuntary outpatient treatment orders.
24. The Virginia Health Records Privacy statute should be clarified to expressly authorize
treatment providers to report noncompliance with involuntary outpatient orders.
Information Privacy Laws
25. Accurate guidance should be developed by the attorney general of Virginia regarding the
application of information privacy laws to the behavior of troubled students. The guidance
should clearly explain what information can be shared by concerned organizations and
individuals about troubled students.
26. Privacy laws should be revised to include “safe harbor” provisions. The provisions should
insulate a person or organization from liability (or loss of funding) for making a disclosure with a
good faith belief that the disclosure was necessary to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the
person involved or members of the general public.
27. The following amendments to FERPA should be considered: FERPA should explicitly
explain how it applies to medical records held for treatment purposes.
28. The Department of Education should allow more flexibility in FERPA’s “emergency”
exception. As currently drafted, FERPA contains an exception that allows for release of records
in an emergency, when disclosure is necessary to protect the health or safety of either the student
or other people.
29. Schools should ensure that law enforcement and medical staff (and others as necessary) are
designated as school officials with an educational interest in school records. This FERPA-related
change does not require amendment to law or regulation.
30. The Commonwealth of Virginia Commission on Mental Health Reform should study
whether the result of a commitment hearing (whether the subject was voluntarily committed,
involuntarily committed, committed to outpatient therapy, or released) should also be publicly
available despite an individual’s request for confidentiality.
31. The national higher education associations should develop best practice protocols and
associated training for information sharing.
Gun Purchases and Campus Policies
32. All states should report information necessary to conduct federal background checks on gun
purchases.
33. Virginia should require background checks for all firearms sales, including those gun shows.
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34. Anyone found to be a danger to themselves or others by a court-ordered review should be
entered in the Central Criminal Records Exchange database regardless of whether they
voluntarily agreed to treatment.
35. The existing attorney general’s opinion regarding the authority of universities and colleges to
ban guns on campus should be clarified immediately.
36. The Virginia General Assembly should adopt legislation in the 2008 session clearly
establishing the right of every institution of higher education in the Commonwealth to regulate
the possession of firearms on campus if it so desires. The panel recommends that guns be banned
on campus grounds and in buildings unless mandated by law.
37. Universities and colleges should make clear in their literature what their policy is regarding
weapons on campus.
Double Homicide at West Ambler Johnson
38. In the preliminary stages of an investigation, the police should resist focusing on a single
theory and communicating that to decision makers.
39. All key facts should be included in an alerting message, and it should be disseminated as
quickly as possible, with explicit information.
40. Recipients of emergency messages should be urged to inform others.
41. Universities should have multiple communication systems, including some not dependent on
high technology. Do not assume that 21st century communications may survive an attack or
natural disaster or power failure.
42. Plans for canceling classes or closing the campus should be included in the university’s
emergency operations plan.
Mass Shooting at Norris Hall
43. Campus police everywhere should train with local police departments on response to active
shooters and other emergencies.
44. Dispatchers should be cautious when giving advice or instructions by phone to people in a
shooting or facing other threats without knowing the situation.
45. Police should escort survivors out of buildings, where circumstances and manpower permit.
46. Schools should check the hardware on exterior doors to ensure that they are not subject to
being chained shut.
47. Take bomb threats seriously. Students and staff should report them immediately, even if most
do turn out to be false alarms.
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Emergency Medical Services
48. Montgomery County, VA should develop a countywide emergency medical services, fire,
and law enforcement communications center to address the issues of interoperability and
economies of scale.
49. A unified command post should be established and operated based on the National Incident
Management System Incident Command System model.
50. Emergency personnel should use the National Incident Management System procedures for
nomenclature, resource typing and utilization, communications, and unified command.
51. An emergency operations center must be activated early during a mass casualty incident.
52. Regional disaster drills should be held on an annual basis. The drills should include hospitals,
the Regional Hospital Coordinating Center, all appropriate public safety and state agencies, and
the medical examiner’s office. They should be followed by a formal post-incident evaluation.
53. To improve multi-casualty incident management, the Western Virginia Emergency Medical
Services Council should review/revise the Multi-Casualty Incident Medical Control and the
Regional Hospital Coordinating Center functions.
54. Triage tags, patient care reports, or standardized Incident Command System forms must be
completed accurately and retained after a multi-casualty incident.
55. Hospitalists, when available, should assist with emergency department patient dispositions in
preparing for a multi-casualty incident patient surge.
56. Under no circumstances should the deceased be transported under emergency conditions. It
benefits no one and increases the likelihood of hurting others.
57. Critical incident stress management and psychological services should continue to be
available to EMS providers as needed.
Office of the Chief Medical Examiner
58. The chief medical examiner should not be one of the staff performing the postmortem exams
in mass casualty events; the chief medical examiner should be managing the overall response.
59. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME) should work along with law
enforcement, Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), chaplains, Department
of Homeland Security, and other authorized entities in developing protocols and training to
create a more responsive family assistance center (FAC).
60. The OCME and Virginia State Police in concert with FAC personnel should ensure that
family members of the deceased are afforded prompt and sensitive notification of the death of a
family member when possible and provide briefings regarding any delays.
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61. Training should be developed for FAC, law enforcement, OCME, medical and mental health
professionals, and others regarding the impact of crime and intervention for victim survivors.
62. OCME and FAC personnel should ensure that a media expert is available to manage media
requests effectively and that victims are not inundated that may increase their stress.
63. The Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services should mandate training for law
enforcement officers on death notifications.
64. The OCME should participate in disaster or national security drills and exercises to plan and
train for effects of a mass fatality situation on ME operations.
65. The Virginia Department of Health should continuously recruit board-certified forensic
pathologists and other specialty positions to fill vacancies within the OCME.
66. The Virginia Department of Health should have several public information officers trained
and well versed in OCME operations and in victims’ services. When needed, they should be
made available to the OCME for the duration of the event.
67. Funding to train and credential volunteer staff, such as the group from the Virginia Funeral
Director’s Association, should be made available in order to utilize their talents.
68. The Commonwealth should amend its Emergency Operations Plan to include an emergency
support function for mass fatality operations and family assistance.
69. Emergency management plans should include a section on victim services that addresses the
significant impact of homicide and other disaster-caused deaths on survivors and the role of
victim service providers in the overall plan.
70. Universities and colleges should ensure that they have adequate plans to stand up a joint
information center with a public information officer and adequate staff during major incidents on
campus.
71. When a family assistance center is created after a criminal mass casualty event, victim
advocates should be called immediately to assist the victims and their families.
72. Regularly scheduled briefings should be provided to victims’ families as to the status of the
investigation, the identification process, and the procedures for retrieving the deceased.
73. Because of the extensive physical and emotional impact of this incident, both short- and
long-term counseling should be made available to first responders, students, staff, faculty
members, university leaders, and the staff of The Inn at Virginia Tech.
74. Training in crisis management is needed at universities and colleges.
75. Law enforcement agencies should ensure that they have a victim services section or
identified individual trained and skilled to respond directly and immediately to the needs of
victims of crime from within the department.
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76. It is important that the state’s Victims Services Section work to ensure that victims are linked
with local victim assistance professionals for ongoing help related to their needs.
77. Since all crime is local, the response to emergencies caused by crime should start with a local
plan that is linked to the wider community.
78. Universities and colleges should create a victim assistance capability either in house or
through linkages to county-based professional victim assistance providers for victims of crime.
79. In order to advance public safety and meet public needs, Virginia’s colleges and universities
need to work together as a coordinated system of state-supported institutions.
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Recommended State and Local Action
1. Increase information sharing and collaboration among state and local communities, educators,
mental health officials, and law enforcement to detect, intervene, and respond to potential
incidents of violence in schools and other venues.
2. Provide accurate information to help ensure that family members, educational administrators,
mental health providers, and other appropriate persons understand when and how they are legally
entitled to share and receive information about mental illness, particularly where college and
youth are involved, for the protection and well-being of the student and the community.
3. Along with reviewing federal laws that may apply, clarify and promote wider understanding
about how state law limits or allows the sharing of information about individuals who may pose
a danger to themselves or others, and examine state law to determine if legislative or regulatory
changes are needed to achieve the appropriate balance of privacy and security.
4. Prioritize and address legal and financial barriers to submitting all relevant disqualifying
information to the NICS and other crucial inter-agency information sharing systems to prevent
individuals who are prohibited from possessing firearms by federal or state law from acquiring
firearms from federally licensed firearms dealers.
5. The U.S. Department of Education should ensure that its emergency management grantees
have clear guidance on the sharing of information to educational records and FERPA.
6. Federal agencies should continue to work together, and with states and appropriate partners, to
improve, expand, coordinate, and disseminate information and best practices in behavioral
analysis, threat assessments, and emergency preparedness, for colleges and universities.
7. The U.S. Department of Education, in collaboration with the U.S. Secret Service and the
Department of Justice, should explore research of targeted violence in IHEs and continue to
share existing threat assessment methodology with interested institutions.
8. Develop cultures within schools and IHEs that promote safety, trust, respect, and open
communication.
9. Educate and train parents, teachers, and students to recognize warning signs and known
indicators of violence and mental illness and to alert those who can provide for safety and
treatment.
10. Establish and publicize widely a mechanism to report and respond to reported threats of
violence.
11. Evaluate state and local community mental health systems to ensure their adequacy in
providing a full array and continuum of services, including mental health services for students,
and in providing meaningful choices among treatment options.
12. Integrate mental health screening, treatment, and referral with primary health care.

112
13. Review emergency services and commitment laws to ensure the standards are clear,
appropriate, and strike the proper balance among liberty, safety for the individual and the
community, and appropriate treatment.
14. Where a legal ruling mandates a course of treatment, make sure that systems are in place to
ensure thorough follow-up.
15. Integrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management planning for schools into
overall local and state emergency planning.
16. Institute regular practice of emergency management response plans and revise them as issues
arise and circumstances change.
17. Communicate emergency management plans to all school officials, school service workers,
parents, students, and first responders.
18. Develop a clear communication plan and tools to communicate rapidly with students and
parents to alert them when an emergency occurs. Utilize technology to improve notification,
communication, and security systems.
19. Ensure of law enforcement through enhanced professionalism of campus police forces and
joint training with federal, state, and local law enforcement.
20. Be prepared to provide both immediate and longer term mental health support following an
event, and evaluate events and the response to them in order to gather lessons learned and
implement corrective measures.
Recommended Federal Action
21. The U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services and Education should develop
additional guidance that clarifies how information can be shared legally under HIPAA and
FERPA and disseminate it to the mental health, education, and law enforcement communities.
22. The U.S. Department of Education should ensure that parents and school officials understand
how and when post-secondary institutions can share information on college students with
parents.
23. The U.S. Departments of Education and Health and Human Services should consider whether
further actions are needed to balance more appropriately the interests of safety, privacy, and
treatment implicated by FERPA and HIPAA.
24. The U.S. Department of Justice, through the FBI and ATF, should reiterate the scope and
requirements of federal firearms laws, including guidance on the federal firearms prohibitions in
the Gun Control Act of 1968 and how to provide information to the NICS on persons whose
receipt of a firearm would violate state or federal law.
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25. The U.S. Department of Justice, through the FBI and ATF, should continue to encourage
state and federal agencies to provide all appropriate information to the NICS so that required
background checks are thorough and complete.
26. The U.S. Department of Justice should work with states to provide appropriate guidance on
policies and procedures that would ensure that relevant and complete information is available for
background checks.
27. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should work through the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Academic Centers of Excellence on Youth Violence
Prevention and collaborate with the U.S. Department of Education to identify opportunities to
expand CDC's "Choose Respect" initiative so that it includes efforts to develop healthy school
climates and prevent violence in schools.
28. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should include a focus on college
students in its mental health public education campaign to encourage young people to support
their friends who are experiencing mental health problems.
29. The U.S. Departments of Education, Health and Human Services, and Justice should
continue to work together and with states and local communities to improve and expand their
collaboration on their "Safe Schools/Healthy Students" program.
30. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should convene the directors of state
mental health, substance abuse, and Medicaid agencies and constituent organizations to explore
ways to expand and better coordinate delivery of evidence-based practices and community-based
care to adults and children with mental and substance use disorders.
31. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services should examine current strategies for
implementing innovative technologies in the mental health field to enhance service capacity,
through such means as telemedicine, electronic health records, health information technology,
and electronic decision support tools in health care.
32. The interagency Federal Executive Steering Committee on Mental Health led by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services should promote federal agency collaboration to
support innovations in mental health services and supports for school aged children and young
adults in primary care and specialty mental health settings using evidence-based programs and
innovative technologies.
33. The U.S. Department of Education should review its information regarding emergency
management planning to ensure it addresses the needs of IHEs and then disseminate it widely.
34. The U.S. Departments of Education, Homeland Security, and Justice should collaborate and
be proactive in helping state, local, and campus law enforcement receive desired training and
making them aware of federal resources on behavioral analysis, active shooter training, and other
research and analysis relevant to preparedness and response.

114
35. The U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, jointly and separately, and in
collaboration with the U.S. Department of Education, should consider programs to be used to
facilitate joint training exercises for state, local, and campus law enforcement.
36. The U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services and Homeland Security should
examine their community preparedness grants to state and local communities, which include an
emphasis on early detection of hazards through information sharing, to clarify the grants that are
available for the prevention of and preparedness for violence in schools, offices, and public
places.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Education, and U.S.
Department of Justice. 2007. Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech
Tragedy. Washington, D.C
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CAMPUS THREAT ASSESSMENT POLICY QUESTIONNAIRE
Hello. My name is Russ Panico and I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Public Administration at Western
Michigan University. I am conducting a study regarding the policy processes used by Michigan
community colleges for the development and implementation of campus threat assessment
protocols. The questions are based on the policy-making framework developed by Dr. Eugene
Bardach and called the Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis. The purpose of this study is to gather
perspectives that emerge from the 27 community colleges as their own unique situations are
viewed through Dr. Bardach’s framework.
Responses to the open-ended questions are very important to a thorough understanding and will
greatly enhance my ability to identify similarities and differences among Michigan’s community
colleges. Please use the space on the backside or additional sheets of paper if needed.
Q1) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that your institution has a formal campus
threat assessment policy?
A Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

What was the primary reason for its implementation?

Q2) To what extent do you agree or disagree that when your institution defined the
problem of campus violence, this definition included threats of violence?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

What is your college’s definition of campus violence?

Q3) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your
institution assembled evidence and/or collected data of the problem of campus violence?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

What was the evidence and/or data collected?

Disagree

Strongly Disagree
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Q4) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that when constructing policy alternatives
your institution weighed the risks and benefits of each potential alternative?

Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

What were some of the risks and benefits of each potential alternative?

Q5) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your
institution included a method to be used to determine the outcomes (measure of success) of
the policy option chosen?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

What were those methods and did show any success?

Q6) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your final
policy decision to address campus violence had an impact or satisfied the needs of all
stakeholders?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

How did the final decision satisfy the needs of stakeholders?

Q7) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your
institution confronted the trade-offs or deviations in the projected outcomes address acts of
campus violence?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

What were the trade-offs and/or deviations from the projected outcomes?

Q8) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your
institution conducted internal checks to determine how the policy-decision makers were
doing in the development of a policy to address campus violence?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree
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What type of checks and how often were they conducted?

Q9) To what extent do you agree or disagree, that in the policy-making process your
institution told the story or presented the policy decision to all stakeholders?
Agree

Strongly Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

How was this message delivered?

Q10) Is there anything else you would like to add to the responses you have provided?

Thank you so very much for your participation in this study! It is my hope that the results of this
study will be made final by the spring of 2016. At that point, I plan to provide the findings of
this study to all potential participants.

If you have any questions about this questionnaire please feel free to contact me at 269-488-4393
or russell.t.panico@wmich.edu.
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WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
School of Public Administration
Principal Investigator:
Student Investigator:
Title of Study:

Dr. Matthew S. Mingus, Professor
Russell Panico, PhD Candidate
An Analysis of Campus Violence Threat Assessment Policy
Implementation at Michigan Community Colleges

You are invited to participate in a research project titled “An Analysis of Campus Violence
Threat Assessment Policy Implementation at Michigan Community Colleges." This project will
serve as Russell Panico’s dissertation research for the requirements of the Ph.D. in Public
Administration. This consent document will explain the purpose of this research project and will
cover the time commitment, the procedures used in the study, and the risks and benefits of
participating in this research project. Please read this consent form carefully and completely, and
please ask any questions if you need more clarification.
What are we trying to find out in this study?
This study will determine if Michigan community colleges have formal campus threat
assessment policies. This study will also determine how the policy initiatives occurred by
applying Dr. Eugene Bardach’s Eightfold Path for Policy Analysis. This process includes: (1)
defining the problem; (2) assembling evidence; (3) constructing alternatives; (4) selecting
criteria; (5) projecting outcomes; (6) confronting trade-offs; (7) deciding; and finally, (8) telling
the story. This process will be further explained by the questions themselves.
Who can participate in this study?
Michigan community college student conduct administrators and their direct supervisors.
Where will this study take place?
The researcher will send the questionnaire by U.S. Postal Service. Responses will be returned in
an enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope.
What is the time commitment for participating in this study?
The questionnaire should take no more than one hour to complete. If necessary, a brief followup phone call may occur or follow-up emails to clarify responses provided in the questionnaire.
What will you be asked to do if you choose to participate in this study?
The intent of the questionnaire is to ask the respondents to reflect upon the policy decisionmaking process utilized to implement their campus threat assessment policy and protocol.
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What information is being measured during the study?
Your responses to the questions will be analyzed to determine campus violence policy-decision
themes that may emerge across Michigan’s 28 community colleges.
What are the risks of participating in this study and how will these risks be minimized?
There may be risks associated with your participation in this study based on the sensitive nature
of the subject. The information obtained however, may only be helpful to other community
colleges in the future who are seeking to implement campus threat assessment policy or any type
of policy for that matter.
What are the benefits of participating in this study?
This study is intended to help better understand the problem of campus violence, but also the
necessity for campus threat assessment policy and protocol. Bardach’s policy analysis
framework is a tool that can be applied to any policy initiative. The results of the study will be
provided electronically, free of charge, to all Michigan community colleges after the dissertation
process is complete. The data included in the study will be organized to show each community
college’s respective responses to the survey; however, names of the administrators who
responded will not be included and names of the community colleges will not be included. In
other words, the dissertation will refer to Community College A, Community College B, and so
forth.
Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
There are no costs associated with this study other than your time needed to respond to the
questions (about 1 hour).
Is there any compensation for participating in this study?
There is no compensation for participating in this study. The researcher will, however, send the
results of the study to you upon completion.
Who will have access to the information collected during this study?
The student researcher, Russell Panico, and his dissertation committee members will have access
to the information obtained from the interviews. Each participant will also receive a transcript of
their questionnaire responses.
What if you want to stop participating in this study?
You can choose to stop participating in the study at anytime for any reason. You will not suffer
any prejudice or penalty by your decision to stop your participation. You will experience NO
consequences either academically or personally if you choose to withdraw from this study.
The investigator can also decide to stop your participation in the study without your consent.
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Should you have any questions prior to or during the study, you can contact the primary
investigator, Russell Panico at 269-548-9017 or russell.t.panico@wmich.edu. You may also
contact the Chair, Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at 269-387-8293 or the Vice
President for Research at 269-387-8298 if questions arise during the course of the study.
This consent document has been approved for use for one year by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) as indicated by the stamped date and signature of the board
chair in the upper right corner. Do not participate in this study if the stamped date is older than
one year.
**Providing responses to the attached questionnaire as requested indicates your receipt of
this consent document and willingness to participate in this research project.

